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R A M O N L L U L U S C O N C E P T O F C R E A T I O N 
The numerous writings of R a m o n Llull, born in Palma de Majorca 
probably in 1232, 1 reveal him as a metaphysical philosopher of stature 
who , during the closing three decades of the Thir teenth and the opening 
two of the fourteenth century, repeatedly addressed himself to the pro-
blem of the creation of the world, with the firm conviction that well-esta-
blished rational answers could be arrived at on a number of the more ba-
sic points entailed in the truth of such a creation. It must be acknowled-
ged that , although his answers are essentially in solid accord with traditio-
nal Christian teachings on the question -which he of course accepted on 
the basis of his Christian faith-, Llull regularly endeavored to present and 
to establish them rationally, in a manner that one cannot but declare phi-
losophical. A t least he himself had no doubts that his approach and proce-
dures were along the lines universally recognized as rational and philosophi-
cal, although he consciously utilized the principles and rules of an " A r t " 
which he deemed heaven-inspired and which, be it recalled parenthet i-
cally, attracted the attention of a number of important Renaissance thin-
ke r s 2 and provided Leibnitz with an original model , as it were , for his 
seventeenth century De Arte Combinatoria. Already in two of his earliest 
literary and philosophical composi t ions 3 R a m o n Llull dealt with the theme 
' Helmut Riedlinger, "Introductio Generalis," in ROL V, 124. Llull's year of birth has not been 
established beyond doubt. But all historians agree that it occurred between 1232 and 1235. See Jocelyn 
Hillgarth, Ramon Lull and Lullism in Fourteenlh Century France (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), p. 1, 
n. 4. 
2 In confirmation of this statement see Ca II, 209-249. 
3 Namely the Liber Conlemplationis in Deum and the Liber de Genlili el Tribus Sapienlibus. The 
Latin text of the Liber Contemplationis may be consulted in MOG IX-X. The latin text of the Liber de 
Gentiii may be seen in Vol. II of the same Mainz edition. The original Catalan text of the Libre de 
Contemplacid may be consulted in ORL II-VIII, as well as in OE II, 97-1269. The original Catalan text 
of the Libre del Gentil e los Tres Savis may be consulted in Obras, pp. 3-305, as well as in OE I, 1057-
1142. 
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of the creation of the world, explicitly and in a way that exhibits metaphy-
sical awareness, perspicacity and acumen. He continued to do so, still at 
some length in many of the other numerous books which he managed to 
write, amidst a most active life and constant travels, until practically the 
moment of his death , in the pursuit of several lofty ideals for the well-
being of the world and Chris tendom. Two main reasons are suggested as 
to why he re turned, again and again in incessant writings, to the problem 
of the creation of the world. First and foremost, he wished to establish on 
a sound rational basis the truth of the creation of the world ex nihilo vis-
a-vis the contrary positions espoused by two distinct segments of philoso-
phers within the Islamic world, towards whom he felt genuine respect. Of 
the two positions, that of Avicenna was older, had a wider acceptance and 
was, from the Christian standpoint , more dangerous. It was so because it 
did not explicitly reject the creation of the world. Ra ther it explained it as 
a somewhat complex procession of the many things in the world from the 
reality of the original First Being, but in a manner that implied or signi-
fied a necessary and mediate emanat ion from the First being through a 
series of intermediary agents or causes . 4 The second Arabian philosophical 
position was linked to the name of Averroes who, consistently with his 
appraisal of Aristotle 's philosophy as the highest achievement and truth of 
human reason, resurrected the Greek notion of an eternally existing and 
uncreated world, with all of its mat ter and mot ions . 5 Averroes did so 
within an Islamic world that , on the basis of its faith, also accepts the 
creation of the world out of nothing. An interesting aside in this connec-
tion is the fact that , even as late as only eight years before the Majorcan 
philosopher 's death and when he was about seventy-seven years old, Llull 
persevered vigorously in a lifelong defense of the truth of the creation of 
the world, this t ime against the early fourteenth century Christian follo-
wers of Averroes at the University of Paris, where they had begun to 
exercise leading and active roles within its Ar ts Faculty. A total of twenty-
nine extant anti-Averroistic treatises, written by the philosopher during his 
last Paris stay of two years, between the Summer of 1309 and the Autumn 
of 1311, still bear witness to the steadfastness, vigour, high-mindedness 
and to the insights with which the author carried his philosophical opposi-
tion to a then young movement , which he , in the waning years of his life 
4 Etienne Gilson, A Hislory of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages (New York: Random 
House, 1954), pp. 210-14; Ignatius Brady, A History of Ancienl Philosophy (Milwaukee: The Bruce 
Puhlishing Co., 1959), p. 204-05. 
5 Brady, op. cil. pp. 214-15. 
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but with good reasons, deemed a serious threat to an authentic Christian 
wisdom and phi losophy. 6 
A second factor inclined Llull to explore in depth and to write clearly 
and persuasively on the question of the possible beginning of the world. It 
was part of a wider, generous and ardent desire to penet ra te with his ra-
tional unders tanding, 7 as much as feasible, the religious truths which he 
had long before, since early youth, accepted with a sincere and devout 
faith. T o the loving desire to investigate rationally the truths of faith he 
linked the eagerly valued and related objective of sharing his knowledge 
of the salvific truths of faith with as many members of the human family 
as possible. He wished to do so more specifically and particularly with 
those persons who, he knew, were outside of the Christian fold, but yet 
were geographically near to , if not in the midst of, in some cases, the 
realm of Chris tendom, namely the Jews and M o h a m m e d a n s . 8 It needs no 
more than to be noted of course, that , with these two peoples , there was 
agreement with the Christians on the religious truth of the creation of the 
world. On this specific question therefore, the men whom Llull aimed to 
persuade and to win over rationally were all those others who either, until 
then , had been totally unaware of it or who might have rejected it, at 
least implicitly, as a consequence of their acceptance of the proposition 
that asserts the eternal duration of the world, in some form or ano the r . 9 
With the well-founded conviction that a) differences in thought 
amongst a number of great philosophers (and the schools which have fol-
lowed after them) are the result of a different understanding of the basic 
concepts at issue; and with the realization that b) the creation of the 
world, or correspondingly of its conceivable eternity, has been and rightly 
continues to be a perennial philosophical problem of both consuming inte-
rest and importance, which each generation of metaphysical thinkers must 
6 All of LulPs extant anti-Averroistic treatises have been lately critically edited by Helmut Riedlin-
ger and Hermogenes Harada in ROL V-VIII. 
7 This desire has occasionally brought upon Llull the undeserved accusation of rationalism by some 
of his detractors. On this question see Sebastian Garcias Palou, "San Anselmo de Cantcrbury y el Beato 
Ramon Llull", EL (1957), 63-89; Bartolome M. Xiberta, "El presumpte racionalismc de Ramon Llull." 
EL VII (1963), 153-65; Johannes Stohr, "Las Rationes Necessariae de Ramon Llull, a la luz de sus 
liltimas obras", EL XX (1976), 5-52. 
8 One of Llull's earliest works that reveals his desire to enter into rational dialogue with the wise 
men of other monotheist religions is his Liber de Gentili et Tribus Sapientibus referred to above in notc 
3. The Vita Coaetanea written about five years before the philosopher's death also provides the reader 
with a dramatic account of some of the conversations Llull entered into with a number of Mohammedan 
wise men. The Latin text of the Contemporary Biography can be Found in ROL VIII, 272-304. It is 
includcd among Llull's Opera because it was written by a monastic friend, to whom Llull had recently 
told the story of his life. 
' These were mainly philosophically minded thinkers who inclined to the views expressed by cither 
of the two leading mediacval Arabian philosophers mentioned earlier. 
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invest igate , 1 0 or re-think, for itself -wi thout neglecting of course, the intel-
lectual asistance bequeathed to them by philosophers who have faced up 
to the problem before t h e m - , we shall proceed now to acquaint ourselves 
with the basic points of Ramon Llull's understanding of the creation of the 
world, as it can be gathered from his numerous writings. We hope in this 
manner to arrive at one objective; to obtain as clear an understanding as 
possible of what men signify, or have in mind, generally when they speak 
of the creation of the world. On that account we shall acquaint ourselves, 
almost exclusively, with the Majorcan philosopher 's explanations and sta-
tements regarding the key points at issue when men think, ordinarily and 
explicitly, about such a creation, or correspondingly when others , with 
whom we disagree, assert the eternity of the world. As we advance in our 
task, we shall also become acquainted with the main reasons that were 
subsequently developed into arguments by the philosopher, in order to de-
fend with them rationally the truth regarding the various questions actually 
involved in the problem. Time and space will not permit us on this occa-
sion however, to enter into any detailed analyses of these arguments , ei-
ther those which directly support the philosopher 's position or those which 
are a rebuttal and answer to the opponents of his views. 
Indubitably, when creationist theists defend the truth of the creation 
of the world, what is at issue and what they have in mind is the creation 
of that world stricto sensu, its creation from simply out of no th ing . 1 1 Nor 
1 0 For concrete examples of contemporary metaphysicians concerned with the question of Creation 
see Joseph Owens' already cited book An Elementary Christian Metaphysics (Milwaukee: The Bruce 
Publishing Co., 1962), pp. 99-102; Maurice Halloway, An Introduction to Nalural Theology (New York: 
Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1959), pp. 337-61, and James Francis Anderson, The Cause of Being (St. 
Louis: B. Herdor, 1952). 
" Jacques Maritain, Approaches to God, tr. Peter 0'Reilly (New York: MacMillan Co., 1965), pp. 
46, 47. As for those who deny the creation of the world stricto sensu, what else might the Epicurean 
Roman poet, Lucretius, mean when he repeatedly wrote: "nothing from nothing was ever born?" On 
the Nature of Things, bk. 1, tr. William Ellery Leonard (New York: E. P. Button, 1950), p. 8. Particu-
larly today there is, of course, a less strict or wider usage of the verb "to create". Not infrequently it is 
said that an artist, or even nature creates. Thus also we must interpret the title of George Gamow's The 
Creation of the Universe (London: MacMillan, 1951). Obviously, in such creations there is no question 
of productions out of nothing, or ex nihilo. Rather some pre-existent matter, material or subject, an 
aliquid of one sort or another, has been made use of and acted on by an efficient cause. A master of 
his native tongue, Llull was no exception to this extended and analogous usage of words. It ought to be 
noted however, that he restricted his usage of "to create" and of its derivatives to the ad extra produc-
tions by the First Being, God. As examples, read chapters thirty-two through thirty-six of his encyclope-
dic Liber Contemplationis. In those chapters Llull sings of the creation of the heavens, the four basic 
elements, the first trees, etc. Undoubtedly the author wrote there as he did, just like other careful theist 
thinkers, because of a profound realization of the distinctness and uniqueness of the divine ad extra 
productions. When Llull restricted the usage of creation to God in his writings therefore, it was not 
because of doubts or because of the rejection of an efficiently causal power exercised by beings other 
than God. The possession of such a causal power by humans and other natural beings he clearly ack-
nowledged. The reason rather was Llull's correct understanding that the First Being is at the same time 
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can it be denied obviously that on the other hand, the production of the 
world out of nothing, rejected and indeed declared impossible by the ma-
jority of thinkers who maintain the eternal character and duration of the 
world, is that same strict creation. It may readily be understood that since 
Ramon Llull was always a convinced or thodox monotheist and Christian 
thinker, he could not but defend the classically theistic conception of the 
original creation of the world, of its fundamental and intrinsic essential 
principles and of the original, or first, beings when world first began to 
exist. Llull also held to the strict creation of each separate substance and 
of each rational or human soul. All of these have already come to be , or 
are still coming into existence initially, by way of a strict creation, wherein 
a) no preexistent material cause or prior subject is given, and b) there is 
therefore, a veritable transition from non-being to being, as regards the 
distinct reality of each of them. 
What is really at issue in the disputes regarding the creation of the 
world is its creations stricto sensu, its total creation by a Creator who is 
other than that world or anything of that world and who, acting as the 
total and first efficient cause, brought that world out of sheer and total 
nothingness into existence for the first t ime. In the original production of 
the world therefore, the Creator utilized nothing, indeed had nothing to 
utilize in order to construct with it ei ther the whole, or any of the intrinsic 
principles, of any of the things of that wor ld . 1 2 With that understanding, 
we are ready to pass on more directly to the consideration and examina-
tion of Ramon Llull's understanding of the creation of the world, as it can 
be gathered from his many extant writings and as announced at the outset 
or in the title of this article. First of all, it is to be noted that according to 
the Majorcan philosopher, if the world or anything of the world was only 
given any kind of separate- and objective being when and because it was 
created - a n d this for the reason that there was nothing of it before and, in 
addition, there was nothing with which either it, its principles or any part 
of it might have been m a d e - then the world and the things that constitute 
and always the First Efficient Cause of all reality outside of Himself. Moreover, the First Being alone 
can cause totally the things that He can efficiently bring into existence through the exercise of an infini-
te active power. Amongst all efficient causes, the First Being alone is without need absolutely of any 
cooperative secondary causes in order to produce any of His effects. If Llull described the production of 
the heavens, of the basic elements and of all the first physical beings as "creation" -though not concei-
ving them as created directly out of nothing, but rather as made out of a primal matter, prcviously 
created out of nothing,- it was clearly because he realized well that thc First Being had Himself pre-
viously given being to that first niatter, about which philosophers speak. In thus making those original 
first physical beings, the First Being remains their complete and total efficient cause, for the very simple 
reason that he had created the matter ex nihilo. No finite entity, as such possessed of only finite 
powers. can efficicntly cause and actually make something, except through working on and utilizing 
some pre-existing materials or things. These it simply changes when it "creates" new objects or things. 
1 2 Owens, Op. cit., p. 100. 
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it have obviously not always existed, have not always been, have not al-
ways had their own being. The world and the things in it are consequently 
not eternal and they have not existed, or been, from all a t e rn i ty . 1 3 If it is 
the case that the world has been brought into being because it has been 
made, caused or produced by a First Efficient Cause , with the obvious 
result that it once received its being totally and simpliciter for the first 
time since it was nothing before, then it follows necessarily that the world 
is not eternal in the duration of its being. If therefore, the world was crea-
ted in the strict sense of the word, then it is not eternal . For if it is the 
case that the world and the things in it were originally produced in the 
totality of their being by a First Cause , it cannot be maintained at the 
same time that the world is uncreated and eternal . Now there have been a 
few notable thinkers however, who have been ready to maintain that the 
existence of a created thing from all eternity is not a manifest impossibi-
l i ty , 1 4 at least not demonstrably so. These thinkers would rather. say that 
the world either actually is or at least might possibly be e ternal , al though 
at the same time they are eager to admit that it was created in its being. 
With the exception of the few notable thinkers just noted, it is a fact how-
ever, that most thinkers and persons are inclined to think and to speak of 
an eternal world as an ipso facto uncreated world. Such was undeniably 
the stand of Aristotle and the other great Greek and Hellenistic philoso-
phers about whom we know with any degree of accuracy and certainty. 
According to all of them, and in one form or another , ei ther the world 
itself or at least the principles out of which it arose and which constitute 
therefore, that world, have had no absolute and total beginning. In any 
case, when all is said and done , the world, or at least its intrinsic princi-
ples, must be declared eternal , uncreated and wellnigh as necessary as 
God , or the gods, who has, or have , existed e terna l ly . 1 5 Limiting ourselves 
to the physical or material universe in which we live, it can be stated with 
assurance that for the Greek philosophers of ancient times in general , the 
world or at least the matter and elements that compose its entitative 
reality has or have always existed, eternally and separately from any possi-
ble maker of the world. Clearly, if we wish to speak of a maker of the 
world as a creator, we shall have to do so only in the wide usage and 
meaning of the te rm, not in its strict one . H e r e we may recall how neither 
the basic elements of the earliest philosophers, nor the unformed mat ter 
of Plato and Aristotle, nor the indivisible and invisible a toms of the Ato-
mist School were ever conceived by their proponents as created in their 
13 Liber de Genlili, bk. 2, art. 2, MOG II, 44-8 = Int. ii, 24-8. 
1 4 Maritain, Approaches, pp. 46-47; Gilson, op. cil., p. 374. 
1 5 Brady, op. cil., pp. 96, 126. 
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being. Ra the r in each case they thought them eternal in their existence 
and reality, al though recognizing that perhaps the things and the world 
resulting from them might have had an actual and measurable beginning. 
The experienced and observed world of generation and corruption wherein 
we find ourselves and perhaps the universe at large, which is of course 
distinct from G o d and any other divinity, may have today a different 
ar rangement , order and disposition than they had , let us say, many 
billions of years ago. On that account we may possibly say that the world 
had a beginning, because its present constitution and order have not al-
ways been exactly the same. But in the last analysis, all the intrinsic and 
most basic principles that in their own distinct way may have contributed 
to the beginning and to the reality of the present arrangement and form of 
the things of the world have always been in existence. They have been 
around eternally. It has been so because those principles are ultimately 
increated and uncreatable , according to the extant writings of the Greek 
philosophers. For at least that reason, the world did not , and could not , 
ultimately and originally have an external or t ranscendent efficient and to-
tal cause of its being, for at least its intrinsic entitative principles, particu-
larly its mat ter or material cause, have always existed, have been eternally 
in one way or another . Unders tandably , such is and has to be , the consis-
tent position put forth and defended by the at least implicitly atheistic phi-
losophers , 1 6 since in their view, there is no Supreme Existent or Being to 
whom man and the world are in any way indebted for their own existence 
and being, not even originally. Indubitably, for them to accept as indepen-
dently objective or real an authentic creator of the world is tan tamount to 
accepting a t ranscendent First Being, a Being other than the world, to 
whom all things in the world would ultimately owe their reality and being. 
But of course, if on the o ther hand, there is nothing real outside of, and 
in addition to , what we think as man and the world, then obviously there 
has not been , nor will there ever be , a creator of the world, unders tood as 
a total efficient cause of the world 's existence. O n e can readily see that 
this should have been and was the position adopted by either a Democri -
tus of Abdera because of his doctrine of an eternal universe of lifeless and 
non-cognitive a toms, moving totally at random in a limitless void or spa-
c e , 1 7 or by other similarly inclined atheistic ph i losophers . 1 8 But as is well 
known, the notion of an eternal and uncreated world was also the position 
espoused and, to some extent defended by other Greek philosophers, as 
well as by a few of their later non-Greek successors, to whom we cannot 
1 6 Holloway, op. cil., pp. 469-70. 
1 7 Brady, op. cil., p. 65. 
I s Holloway, op. cil., pp. 469-70. 
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attr ibute any outright atheism, by any stretch of the imagination. These 
admittedly theist philosophers were satisfied of the eternal character of the 
universe for different reasons and in different ways. Ar i s to t l e 1 9 for instan-
ce , as well as his later but faithful followers - amongs t whom we must na-
me particularly the Arabian commentator , A v e r r o e s , 2 0 and the members 
of the Latin school named after him, besides other radical Aristotelians 
concluded to the existence of a First Being and Mover who neither is nor 
can be an efficient cause of the world, or of anything outside himself for 
that ma t t e r . 2 1 Certainly, according to all of these Aristotel ians, a transcen-
dent and Divine Being exists, who is the noblest of all beings, is even the 
world's First Cause , but only as the highest final cause. In a sense, it is 
the supreme perfection of such a final cause that prevents it, or stops it, 
from being at all an efficiently creative cause of any reality outside of it-
self. 2 2 Consequently, not only the separate spiritual substances but also the 
world, its material cause and other principles, as well as the species of all 
things, are uncreated and e t e rna l . 2 3 The individual members of each spe-
cies in the world of generation and corruption alone begin to be truly and 
they eventually cease. Before Aristot le , his great teacher, Pla to , had un-
veiled an apparent maker of the world, the famous Demiurge of The Ti-
maeus To that maker the writer of the Dialogues at t r ibuted, at least alle-
gorically, an effective efficient causal i ty 2 4 vis-a-vis the world of becoming 
or of physical being. At the same time also he wrote , perhaps , of the 
world's and of man's beginning at the hands of both the Demiurge and 
the lesser gods. Yet interpreters and scholars unanimously agree that if we 
examine closely the "likely stories" of the Timaeus and give to them the 
most rational explanation possible, the accurate picture of the Demiurge 
that emerges from them falls short from the conception of a Creator of 
the world stricto sensu.25 At most , the platonic Dialogue portrays a creator 
in the wide sense for, in the last analysis, that maker of the world is 
simply a giver of forms, a formator26 or a shaper of things. H e makes the 
world and the things in it by bestowing on an eternally unformed and 
chaotic matter a mysterious share or participation in the reality of the 
world of Forms or I dea s . 2 7 . Like the chaotic matter which they somehow 
" Brady, op. cit., p. 126; Riedlinger. in ROL V, 18. 
2 0 Riedlinger, op. cit., in ROL V, 24. 
21 Ibid., pp. 30, 43, 46, 47, 58. 
2 2 Ibid., p. 17; Brady, op. cit., pp. 126-27; Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy (West-
minster: Newman Press, 1959), Vol. 1, pp. 326-27. 
2 3 Copleston, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 314. 
2 4 Plato, Timaeus 29e-30a in The Collected Dialogues of Plalo, ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington 
Cairns (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), p. 1162. See also Brady, op. cit., pp. 93-94. 
2 5 Owens, op. cil., p. 336; Copleston, op. cil, Vol. 1, p. 248. 
2 6 Brady, op. cit., p. 93. 
27 Ibid., p. 96. 
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inform, the Ideas seem to be entitatively separate and independent from 
the maker of the world, for they are eternally existent in their own intelli-
gible world. The matter or material cause constitutive in great measure of 
most of the instrinsic reality of the things of the sensible world has not 
been brought therefore, into existence at all, for the reason that it has 
never been absolutely nothing. Uncrea ted , it has been around eternally. 
At most the Demiurge only shapes it and gives to it the different forms or 
natures which it receives and has at different times in our physical w o r l d , 2 8 
due to a mysterious disposition wherein consists the imitation of, and the 
participation in, the reality of the eternal Forms and Ideas by the indivi-
dual things of the physical world: a Platonic doctrine so strenuously critici-
zed by Plato 's own greatest s tudent , Ar i s to t l e . 2 9 The point here is simply 
to recall how Plato's maker of the world created nothing in the strict sense 
of the word. H e created neither the mat ter nor the eternal forms, both of 
which in their own distinct way contribute to the inner makeup of the 
things of the world. 
W e find a third and slightly different version of the eternal and un-
created character of the world when we meet with the understanding of 
how that world arose within the philosophy of Plotinus, the last of the 
ancients and with whom their philosophy came to its end, chronologically 
speaking. Within Plotinus ' emanationist account -appropr ia ted and modi-
fied later by several of the outstanding mediaeval Islamic philosophers, es-
pecially A v i c e n n a 3 0 - the world as a whole is explained as the result of an 
eternal and necessary overflow, without diminution or change, from within 
the substance or the O n e , 3 1 the first principle of all that is, al though the 
O n e itself is above being and t h o u g h t . 3 2 Mat ter , with the world that arises 
from it, stands at the outermost limits, as it were , of that eternal outflow 
and radiation from the O n e . 3 3 Yet both mat ter and the world are as ne-
cessary and eternal as the O n e and all the other emanat ions from it, be-
cause ultimately all the apparent multiplicity and diversity present in the 
world are absorbed and disappear, as it were , in the monistic and pan-
theistic reality of the O n e , notwithstanding Plotinus' heroic efforts to 
maintain at all costs a truly meaningful t ranscendence or the One over the 
manifold which is the wor ld . 3 4 By reason of the at least implicit monism of 
2 9 See Aristotle Metaphysics, I, 9, 990a-993a in The Student Oxford Aristotle, tr. W. D. Ross (Lon-
don: Oxford Univ. Press, 1942). Also see Copleston, op. cit., Vol. 1, pp. 293-300. 
3 0 Copleston, op. cit., Vol. 2, (1962), p. 192. 
3 1 Plotinus, Enneads, VI, ix, 5, tr. Stephen McKenna (London: Faber and Faber Ltd., 1962), p. 
619. See also Brady. op. cit., p. 182; and Copleston, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 466. 
3 2 Plotinus, Enneads, VI, viii, 14, p. 608. See also Brady, op. cit., pp. 181-82; and Copleston, op. 
cit., Vol. 1, p. 464. 
3 3 Brady, op. cit., p. 184. 
34 Ibid., pp. 182, 186; Copleston, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 467. 
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any authentic emanationism, not only the first Plotinian emanat ions and 
"created" beings, the Nous or Intelligence and the World-Soul, but also 
even the matter of the world have always been what they are . It cannot 
be otherwise, since in some way they always share in the reality of the 
O n e , from whom they emanate eternally. In some mysterious fashion 
therefore, the world has always been and, within the innermost structure 
of its being, it is not really separate or distinct from the transcendent O n e . 
This in spite of the fact that the One was declared to be superior and 
prior to being because the One has been there eternally, prior to the eter-
nal appearance of all things that have being in a determinate way. Hence 
the general judgment of Plotinus' account of the reality of the world as 
excluding its strict c rea t ion . 3 5 The basis of that judgment lies in at least 
these two reasons: a) there has been no actual transition from non-being 
to being in the eternal emanation of all things from the O n e , and b) there 
is an ultimate oneness to all things which is really no more than a subtle 
monism and pantheism, with the at least implied consequent denial of the 
separate reality of the world from that of the One . 
It was basically their understanding of the nature or the First Princi-
ple or Cause that led the three ancient philosophers to the positions just 
briefly outlined, in which they postulated the eternity of an uncreated 
world. Similarly, it was their different understanding of the ontologically 
First Being, different from, not to say in some basic features contrary to , 
that of most ancient philosophers, that has led classical theists, down 
through the centuries and in harmonious accord with the creationist tea-
ching of the great three monotheist religions, to their distinct and unequi-
vocal denial of the eternal duration of anything of, and within, the world. 
A classical theist upholds a properly conceived divine t ranscendence. Ac-
cording to him, the First Being is at once , in the fulness of the infinity of 
his being, both the ult imate First Efficient Cause and the supreme Final 
Cause of all of the reality and being possessed by every entity that has 
been, or that will ever be , placed in the extramental realm of existence. 3 f i 
By His very na ture , which is literally infinite, the First Being contains, and 
indeed is identical with, the fulness and very essence of being and good-
ness. On that account, He is the absolutaly free and total source of the 
existence and being of all that is not Himself. For reasons wellnigh explicit 
in such an understanding of the First Being, the classical theist sees that 
he cannot but reject outright any thought of an eternally uncreated world, 
or anything that is not God . T o accept as factual and true the eternity of 
Copleston, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 466. 
Holloway, op. cit., p. 389. 
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an uncreated world, or of anything else not G o d , amounts to no less than 
a denial of the singularly unique character of the Infinite Being, whom he 
acknowledges as truly the first efficient cause or all the beings distinct 
from Him. In the inexhaustible perfection of the infinity of His being, the 
First Being is eternally immutable and enduring. 
As seen from the standpoint of classical theism, if it is a fact that the 
great ancient philosophers and not a small number of their followers and 
sucessors, even to the present day, have proposed and defended the no-
tion of an eternal and uncreated world, it is because, due to one or 
another reason, they failed to arrive at the conception of the First Being 
in the correct terms of a sound theism and monotheism. In the case of a 
few of them, namely those who have been either atheists or pantheists , we 
find an outright denial of the reality of the. First Being, as distinct in a 
meaningful way from that of man and the world. In view of such a situa-
t ion, it should not surprise us, as if we had met with something totally 
unexpected, when we come across a philosopher of the character and sta-
ture of Ramon Llull who , contrariwise and in agreement with by far the 
majority of classical theist thinkers , constantly attacked the thought of an 
eternal world as an error and a falsehood, which a sound and true philo-
sophy cannot but always refute, because he saw it as very much opposed 
to the truth and to the correct understanding of the nature of the ontolo-
gically First Being. Wellnigh unceasingly in his many varied books, he re-
minds the reader that the totality of things, whereof we ordinarily speak 
as either " the universe" or " the world" , owes its entire being, ultimately 
and originally, to a creative action on the part of the First Being. The 
world or "second b e i n g " 3 7 - a designation by which Llull occasionally in 
some of his writings names the collectivity of all finite things on account 
of their fundamental distinction and common origin from the First Being 
who has caused t h e m - has ultimately received its being from the First 
Being. All that is the second being has consequently, been created, becau-
se it owes the perfection and character or its being totally to the single 
infinite source of all being, which is none other than the singularly unique, 
uncreated and eternal First Cause and Being. Within basically this thought 
is found the Majorcan philosopher 's rei terated refusal to concede any ra-
tionality to the notion of even the mere possibility of an eternal durat ion, 
to the notion more specifically of a duration without a beginning, in the 
case of anything that is not the First Being. Consequent ly, not only is the 
world not e ternal , but it is al together impossible that it, or anything not 
G o d , might have existed from all eternity, even if one were willing to 
speak of an eternally created being or world. This means that Llull fought 
Melaphysica Nova et Compendiosa, ROL VI, 20. 
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the notion of the eternity of the world on two counts, as it were , or in 
two different ways. First of all and in agreement with all classical theistic 
philosophers, he endeavored to prove, on a few occasions in his writings, 
that it is demonstrably false that the world is both uncreated and eternal . 
This first stand which Llull at tacked is the position of most of the thinkers 
who have professed or maintained, in different ways, the eternity of the 
world. The Majorcan philosopher attacked this idea of an eternal and un-
created world already in one of his earliest literary compositions, namely 
the Liber de Gentili et Tribus Sapientibus. In that book, it is suggested 
that one of the main reasons that led inquiring philosophers to think in 
such terms is the fact of the constant revolutions of the heavenly bodies, 
as well as their apparent incorruptibility. Apar t from the astronomical in-
correctness of that antiquated notion regarding the heavenly bodies, LlulFs 
main point was to observe that the philosophers ' inference concluding to 
the eternity of the heavens was wrong. Therefore , he noted that "the fact 
that both heavens and the heavenly bodies are limited in their extension 
signifies that they have been c r ea t ed . " 3 8 Thirty years later, in a book 
which the author-philosopher intended as the final and definitive version 
of an Art , which he deemed heaven- inspired, 3 9 he again argued: 
If the heavens are eternal , then they have the power to be 
eternally of themselves. This, because what was never in po-
tency to being, can neither be ever in potency to non-being. 
And in such a case, the power of God would not be the cau-
se of the power of the heavens, nor God ' s goodness the cause 
of the goodness ot the heavens. Nor could the power of God 
deprive the heavens of their power, since the heavens, would 
then govern themse lves . 4 0 
Just a few lines earlier in the same book , the author had unequivo-
cally asserted that: "if the heavens are eternal , then they have not been 
created out of nothing, for the simple reason that they have always exis-
t e d . " 4 1 As might well have been expected, given the vigorous convictions 
of a philosopher of the caliber of Llull, upon learning of the recently revi-
3 8 "Respondet Judaeus: in hoc, quod firmamentum et corpora caelestia sunt terminata et finita in 
quantitate, significant, se esse creata". Liber de Genlili, MOG II, 48 = Int. ii, 28. 
3 9 On the origin of Llull's Art read the anonymous Vita Coaetunea, III, ROL VIII, 280. 
4 0 "Si coelum est aeternum, potest per se esse aeternum: quoniam ens aeternum nunquam fuit in 
potentia ad essendum, neque est in potentia ad non essendum: et sic potestas Dei non esset causa potes-
tatis coeli; nec bonitas Dei bonitatis coeli: et potestas Dei non posset privare potestatem coeli, eo quia 
coelum per se gubernaret se." Ramon Llull, Ars Generalis Ultima, 9, s. 3, c. 2, ed. Francis Mari;al 
(Palma: Gabriel Guasp, 1645), pp. 223-24. 
4 1 Si coelum est ab aeterno, non est creatum de nihilo; eo quia semper fuit". Ibid., p. 223. 
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ved radical Aristotelian positions by the early fourteenth century Christian 
followers of the Arabian Averroes , in the name of authentic philosophy 
within the very precincts and lecture halls of the famous mediaeval Uni-
versity of Paris, the academic center of mediaeval Chris tendom, Llull 
again strongly opposed the resurrected Aristotelico-Averroistic tenet asser-
ting the eternal and uncreated character of the world which Aristotle had 
indeed declared caused, but only teleologically. Llull attacked this thesis 
explicitly in several of the twenty-nine extant anti-Averroistic treatises 
wherein, between the end of the summer of the year 1309 and the start of 
the autumn of the year 1311, on a high plane but still quite vigorously he 
disputed all of the Averroistic positions which he deemed offensive, or at 
least very dangerous, to both sound philosophy and Christian o r thodoxy . 4 2 
From the numerous occasions and writings in which he took up the 
appropriate questions, it is unequivocally clear that Llull was categorically 
opposed, not only to the notion of an eternally uncreated world, but also 
to a second and slightly different stand which speaks likewise of an eternal 
world. According to this second notion, the world was, and indeel had to 
be , created. But it ei ther was, or at least could have actually been created 
eternally. Although therefore created, the world has, or could have, exis-
ted from all eternity, since it either actually was, or could have been, 
created from all eternity. Such a different version of the eternity of the 
world Llull, with many others , also considered false. The reason for so 
thinking was that , as Llull and many other outstanding Christian philoso-
phers , t hough t , 4 3 an eternal world must, practically ipso facto as it were , 
be an uncreated and unconditionally necessary world, or at least as eternal 
and necessary as the eternal First B e i n g . 4 4 If things are really so, then the 
First Being is not really the source of the world's being, at least He is not 
its totally free and first efficient cause. The First Being could not in that 
case either have been the Creator of the world, or the second being, stric-
to sensu.45 A number of Llull's writings show amply that the philosopher 
was well acquainted with the position of certain philosophers, particularly 
Islamic ones, in whose opinion there is no obvious incompatibility between 
the two ideas of a) a world that has actually been created and b) the 
same world having existed from all e te rn i ty . 4 6 Indeed, according to some 
See note 6 above. 
4 3 For example St. Bonaventure. See Copleston, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 265. 
4 4 See note 41 above. 
4 5 Liber de Deo et suis Propriis Qualitatibus Infinitis, ROL II, 284-5. See also note 40 above. In 
order to establish that God is the efficient cause through the creation of everything that is contained 
within the second being Llull wrote in May of 1311 his Liber de Efficiente et Effectu (ROL VII, 273-91). 
4 6 See Llull's Liber de Gentiti, bk. 2, art. 2, MOG II, 47 = Int. ii, 27; also Arthur Hyman and 
James Walsh, Philosophy in the Middle Ages (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1974), pp. 234-35; 
Etienne Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas (New York: Random House, 1966), p. 
147. 
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of those philosophers, not only could or might the world have existed 
from all eternity, but it actually has done so. This notwithstanding their 
declaration and acceptance of the truth that the world has actually been 
created by God or the First Cause. The world, consequently, has indeed 
received all of its being originally and ultimately from the First Cause. It 
has been truly created by Him, but it has been so created from all eter-
nity, without a real beginning of the world 's existence, which is therefore 
eternal , or at least eternally beginningless. According to the thought of 
those philosophers, the world has been made , it has been produced, and 
indeed it has been created out of nothing (as taught also by the Islamic 
religion); but it has been made and created e te rna l ly . 4 7 
As suggested a few lines above , Llull was acquainted with the notion 
of an eternally created universe as it was proposed in his day by a few 
influential Arabian followers of the philosopher Avicenna. The latter had 
perhaps simply intended to utilize, as best he could, the language of Neo-
platonic emanationism in order to express in meaningful philosophical lan-
guage the conception of the creation of the world out of nothing by the 
First C a u s e . 4 8 Regardless of intentions however , the Avicennian account 
appears to end up , according to most historians and critics, as just another 
version of the emanationist theory first ingeniously devised by Plotinus 
centuries earlier. The physical world is viewed as a product ion t raceable, 
at least mediately, to the First Cause , but by way of some sort of emana-
tion from the tenth and last of the Avicennian separate Intelligences, of 
which the first alone proceeds immediately from the First Cause as its 
eternally necessary and first emanat ion . But whether or not one uses the 
language of creation or of emanat ion , according to Avicenna and his follow-
ers, the world has ultimately proceeded from its causes with a necessity of 
nature , rather than f reely . 4 9 Eager and rntent on not compromising in the 
least the eternal perfection and immutability of the Supreme Being, as 
well as undoubtedly wishing to be as faithful to the teaching on creation 
of their religion, a few later Islamic philosopher-theologians, whose 
thought was personally known to Ramon Llull as indicated in his writings, 
modified Avicenna 's position slightly. Accordingly, they taught more expli-
citly that the First Being truly created the world and brought it into being 
as its First Efficient Cause. But yet H e did so clearly from all eternity and 
without freedom, for otherwise H e would have been totally idle or inacti-
ve from all eternity, until the moment when H e decided, and then carried 
out the design, to create the world or other beings not Himself. For that 
4 7 Gilson, History, p. 212. 
4 8 Copleston, op. cit., p. 192; Brady, op. cit., p. 203. 
4 9 Copleston, op. cit., p. 192; Brady, op. cit., p. 205. 
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reason, the world must have been created and must have existed from all 
eternity. As an alternative, we have to be willing to admit that the First 
Cause was inactive until It brought the world into being, with the logical 
implication that It has changed from a prior state of inactivity and idleness 
to a subsequent one in which It became fruitfully active and c rea t ive . 5 0 
The world is therefore, both created and eternal , and it is impossible that 
it be otherwise, as long as God is God . A similar thought had been enter-
tained many centuries earlier by the speculatively talented early Ghristian 
thinker , Origen. According to this writer also, a non-eternal production 
and creation of the world, or of some first world, would introduce new-
ness and change into the supposedly perfect and immutable First Being. 
Without sufficiently distinguishing the act of creating on the part of God 
and the reality of the created world as the ad extra product of creation on 
the other , Origen thought that a non-eternal world, or worlds, necessarily 
entails a transition or change on the side of G o d , because He would then 
not have been acting and creating until He made a wor ld . 5 1 To this one 
more point was added by the Arabian thinkers, whose thought Llull had 
very much always in mind. According to them, the inevitable change im-
plied in a non-eternal creation establishes also the unacceptable point that 
the First Being was not fully the superlatively perfect being until the 
world, as the affect of a non-eternal creation, received its be ing . 5 2 The 
perfection of the First Being would in such a case have been incomplete 
or unfinished until It began to exercise Its efficient power to act exteriorly 
and to create either the world or some other external effect. 
Without at least one external and eternal effect or product to show, as it 
were , the efficient power of the First Cause was eternally inactive and id-
le, and remained consequently, incomplete and unfinished and was indeed 
quite imperfect until the creation of the world. The First Being might have 
been in existence eternally, but without any activity and operat ions to 
crown it with its requisite total fulfillment. They would have only begun 
when the world was finally created, adding thereby in some way to the 
perfection of the First Being, who therefore would not have been supre-
mely perfect before. In lines that bespeak solid esteem and respect for the 
sincerity and good intentions of philosophers with whom he disagreed, 
Llull reveals his awareness both of their thought and of the reasons which 
led them to views which he considered false, specifically those of an eter-
nal world and an imperfect God. In a short passage which we shall pre-
sently cite, he also traces their apparent failures on the matter to their 
5 0 See Llull, Liber de Gentili, bk. 2, art. 2, MOG II, 47-8 = Int. ii, 27-8; Sermones Conlra Aver-
rois, ROL VII, 251; also the Vita Coaetanea, ROL VIII, 298. 
5 1 Gilson, History, p. 40. 
5 2 Anon. Vita Coaetanea, loc. cit. 
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ignorance of the infinitely and eternally productive interior life within the 
Godhead , realized fully in the perfectly immanent activities with which the 
Divine Being is eternally and supremely perfect and self-sufficient. As a 
consequence, they were also ignorant of the fact that , in order to have 
fully the infinite perfection of His nature and being, God stands in no 
need at all of any external works or productions wherewith, in the exerci-
se of his efficient power and causality H e can bring into existence beings 
other than Himself. In kind and sympathetic words Llull explains that 
The principal reason why philosophers desire greatly to prove 
that the world is eternal is so that they thus attribute honor 
to the First Cause, i.e. God . From that Cause the philoso-
phers proceeded down to their understanding of other things. 
They asserted that since It is the Cause and the End of all 
things, and since It is e ternal , in the same fashion, whatever 
it has caused, its effect in other words, must also be eternal . 
And that effect they identified with the wor ld . 5 3 
It is not possible to state with assurance whether Llull was, or was 
not , explicitly aware of the slightly different position advocated by a few 
other thinkers, among whom as the leading one we must name the Ange-
lic Doctor , St. Thomas Aquinas . O n e of the acknowledged great masters 
of authentic Christian thought , St. Thomas accepted, on the basis of his 
Christian faith, the truth of the doctrine of the non-eternal creation of the 
world from the standpoint , of course, of the actual external production of 
the reality of anything distinct from God . He was moreover also convin-
ced that men can demostrably prove, by reason alone, that the world with 
all that is not the First Being was, and had to be, created in order to 
possess its objective existence. The world owes its whole being originally 
therefore, to the First Being who alone has the power to create in the 
sense of making something to be totally, without any pre-existing subjects 
or material causes. Thirdly, according to the Angelic Doctor , reason can 
also establish the non-conclusive character of any arguments that purpor-
tedly demonstra te the eternal existence of the world. Reason, in other 
words, is incapable of showing as a totally uncreated entity or as a created 
thing. But at the same time Aquinas holds further, that reason cannot dis-
prove altogether that the world might or could have existed from all eter-
nity, although however, in a created fashion, since it would still have re-
5 3 "Hoc, per quod philosophi maxime volunt probare, quod mundus sit aeternus, est, ut dent hono-
rem et nobilitatem primae causae, hoc est, Deo; a qua prima causa dicti philosophi devenerunt in noti-
tiam rerum, dicentes: quod, sicut prima causa est causa et finis omnium, et est aeterna, ita conveniat, 
quod ejus causatum, videlicet ejus effectus sit aeternus; hoc autem causatum dixcrunt esse mundum". 
Liber de Gentili, bk. 2, art. 2, MOG II, 47 = Int. ii, 27. 
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ceived its being from the creative First C a u s e . 5 4 In the mind of Aquinas 
and a few other thinkers in other words, God could conceivably have 
created the world from all eternity (although He has not done so of cour-
se). H e could have done so, not simply in the sense that the creative act is 
eternal on the side of the First Being who is eternally perfect and immuta-
ble and not subject to t ime; but also in the sense that the world itself 
might have received its existence without beginning, since the act of the 
First Cause is eternal and without beginning or change. In agreement with 
all other classical theists, Aquinas and the thinkers who side with him on 
this last point reject as false the notion that the world is both eternal and 
unc rea t ed , 5 5 which is the stand of men who deny that God is truly a crea-
tively efficient cause, either because of an outright atheism or because 
they look upon God as simply and only the ultimate final cause of the 
world. There is general agreement also among all classical theists, among 
whom Aquinas is counted, in declaring false the understanding of the First 
Cause as in any way causing and creating the world, but as a result of a 
necessity of na ture , without therefore, any divine freedom and with the 
implication that the First Being is unfinished and defective in the absence 
of the actual extramental realization of at least one of the possible effects 
of Its infinitely and eternally efficient causal i ty . 5 6 A third point of agree-
ment between Aquinas and other classical theists is closely linked to the 
last one . It is that human reason can demonstrably show that the First 
Being is the only absolutely necessary be ing ; 5 7 and this of course, explains 
the previous point of agreement that creation stricto sensu is, on the side 
of the creator , an entirely gratuitous and free gift of being on His crea-
tions or creatures. The entirely gratuitous character of creation is at the 
same time used by thinkers who side with Aquinas as a confirmation of 
their thought that the creation of the world, with an actual beginning of 
its existence understood as a temporal beginning, is simply a truth of faith, 
a truth known by men only because it has been supernaturally revealed. 
The creation of the world with a beginning in time cannot be established 
by reason. But on the other hand, as noted earlier although human 
thought cannot conclusively show the impossibility of an eternally created 
universe, it cannot demonstra te apodictically either the possibility of an 
eternally created un ive r se . 5 8 
In none of his numerous extant writings does Llull explicitly advert to 
and refute the position of St. Thomas Aquinas on a conceivably eternal 
Gilson, The Chrislian Phiios., pp. 147-52. 
5 5 Gilson, Hislory, p. 373. 
5 6 Copleston, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 365. 
5 7 Gilson, The Chrislian Philos., p. 70. 
5 8 Gilson, History, p. 374. 
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world, about which he may have heard , .o r read, during one of his four or 
five visits to Paris, in whose university Llull was authorized to lecture on 
the "Ar t of Finding T r u t h " . 5 9 But still, even in the absence of any explicit 
references to Aquinas ' exact position, Llull's writings make it sufficiently 
clear that he would not approve of it. Indeed he rejected it, at least impli-
citly, when he explicitly rejected the very possibility that any created subs-
tance, including spiritual ones , can be equal with God as regards the parti-
cular mode of infinity which characterizes all of God ' s perfections and 
being. Just as no creature, simply because of its necessary finiteness, can 
be created with either a magnitude or goodness that are infinite, so also 
no creature can be caused or brought into being with a duration of its 
existence that is totally limitless, or infinite, in every possible w a y . 6 0 Such 
would be the case however, if it were actually beginningless and eternal . 
To the direct question of whether it is possible for the heavens to be eter-
nal Llull gives a reply in these words: 
It was proven that the heavens are not eternal . Nor is it even 
possible that they be eternal . Thence it follows that the entire 
universe is new and that it has been brought into being, so-
mething it did not have be fo re . 6 1 
Now although the world could not have been given its existence from 
all eternity, it is incorrect to think that this is due to a positive lack or 
limitation in the power of the First Being, for we must acknowledge, and 
it can be established elsewhere, that the divine power is of itself absolutely 
infinite. In discussions regarding God ' s infinite power, particularly in writ-
ten disputations against the Averroists of his day who claimed philosophi-
cally to limit God 's active power, almost to the point of denying it altoge-
ther , Llull made it abundantly clear that it is not a question of any limits 
or imperfections on the side of the Creator ' s power. Rather it is all due to 
the very nature of anything which has reality within the totality that is the 
second being, i.e. the world, and all that is not the First being. Everything 
that is not God is of its nature finite and contingent. It is for that very 
reason totally incapable of receiving and keeping any perfections, inclu-
ding the most basic one of existence, except in a clearly limited or finite 
fashion. 6 2 No finite entity - a n d no created being can be o therwise- is ca-
5'' Riedlinger, op. cil., in ROL V, 136-7. 
60 Liber de Perversione Enlis Removenda, ROL V, 477-8. 
6 1 "Probatum est, quod caelum non est aeternum; nec etiam est possibile ipsum esse aeternum. Ad 
quod sequitur, quod totum universum est novum et deductum in esse, quod non erat"; Ars Mystica 
Theologiae et Philosophiae, d. 4, 3, ROL V, 413. 
6 2 Liber de Perversione Entis Removenda, ROL V, 477. 
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pable of ever coming close, even from a distance, to the infinity which is 
uniquely proper of the First Being and wherewith He stands alone as the 
absolutely necessary and singular being that He is. On the other hand, 
Llull goes on to recognize that the First Being, by reason of His unique 
infinity, stands always ready to bestow on His creations more than any of 
them is capable of receiving. He stands ready to bestow on them any per-
fection even to the point of infinity, as it were , if only any of them were 
sufficient to receive as m u c h . 6 3 All created beings however, are by their 
very nature limited and finite, and consequently they are totally removed 
from the boundless infinity that is required in order to receive and possess 
even one perfection in an unlimited and infinite way. Now if a created 
being were eternally in existence and without a beginning, then it would 
possess its existence in an unlimited or infinite way. But that it cannot do, 
precisely because it cannot be otherwise than contingent and finite. For 
that reason, R a m o n Llull rejected altogether the notion of any creature 
that might or could conceivably have been created from all eternity, whe-
ther the creature be the world considered in its totality or any single subs-
tance of whatever kind. H e had no choice but to do so, since the notion 
of an eternally created creature appeared to him practically absurd and 
contradictory, if one unders tands correctly the nature of a finite being as 
such. Llull tried to show that it is so by reminding us that undoubtedly, in 
the minds of nearly all people , creation signifies an act of making some-
thing that had not been be fo re , 6 4 at least not in the same way. Moreover , 
as we saw earlier, creation strictly taken is an act of making that entails, 
as far as the created being is concerned, its transition from totally not 
being, from its lack of being altogether, from its simply non-being, to the 
possession of being, to its. being simpliciter, for the first time altogether in 
an extramental way. Previously to its creation stricto sensu, the created 
object or thing did not exist at all. It only began to exist when it was 
created. We noted earlier that the transition associated with strict creation 
is not like the transitions that occur when things that already are change 
from being this to being that , from being in this way to being in that way 
or from being this particular thing to being another thing. In strict crea-
t ion, it is simply a transition from not being at all, from being nothing, to 
being and to being something for the first t i m e . 6 5 It is not therefore, a 
6 3 Loc. cit. 
6 4 "Si coelum est ab aeterno, non est creatum de nihilo; eo quia semper fuit... Unde sequitur. quod 
mundus non esset effectus Dei, quoad suam bonitatem, et magnitudinem... Et quia omnia ista sunt 
impossibilia; sequitur quod coelum creatum est, et novum". Ars Generalis, 9, s. 3, c. 2, ed. cit. p. 223. 
6 5 "... sed in creatione non est ita, quia ipsa non est subjecta generationi et corruptioni, sed produc-
tioni creaturae productae de non esse in esse, quae creatura non esset producta de non esse in esse, si 
antequam produceretur, esset in potentia; nam si esset in potentia. esset aliquid". Liber de Anima Ra-
tionali, MOG VI, 422 = Int. vii, 8. "In hoc, Domine, quod aeternitas tibi est propria, probatur quod 
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question of a transition measurable by the moments of before and after 
that occur, or are distinguishable, whenever things are made , or created, 
but through changing one thing into another . In creation strictly under-
stood, a thing therefore, is not made , is not made to be , gradually. It is 
made instantly and totally in the essentials of its nature when, through 
creation, it begins to be. The transition involved in creation strictly taken 
is not therefore, a temporal one , for it is not a transition that involves 
change in the proper meaning of the word. As stated more than once, the 
transition is simply from non-being to being, because the created thing did 
not exist extramentally at all before, neither itself completely nor any of 
the principles that make it to be what it is, at least partially. Conse-
quently, we must not and cannot think that a created being has always 
been. To say that it has, is to say that it has not passed from non-being to 
being. If a thing has always been, without therefore having gone from its 
total non-being to being something, then it has not been made , it has not 
been created. If something has always been - a n d this is the common un-
derstanding of the statement that the world is or might be e t e rna l - then it 
is unc rea t ed . 6 6 If the world has always existed because it is eternal , then 
one cannot legitimately think that its non-being has come before its being 
and existence. In such a case, the quasi terminus a quo of non-being im-
plied in the understanding and definition of creation stricto sensu, was ne-
ver given. Consequently, a world or thing that either has, or could pos-
sibly have, existed eternally, without a beginning to and of its being, is 
not a world that has -been made . And less could it have been created, 
since in order to be so made or created, it must not have been before its 
creation. Certainly at least, a beginningless world or thing could not have 
been created ex nihilo because it would have always been, instead of not 
having been anything at all before in order that it might then be made 
and created after, and because, it had been nothing. According to Llull 
therefore, to propose a world that is at once created and eternal is to pro-
pose what is an impossibility and a contradic t ion . 6 7 For that reason, he 
was ready to reject the notion as in a way a more ridiculous and less un-
derstandable error than the one which gives us a world that is both eternal 
and uncreated. 
creaturae sint creatae ex nihilo; nam, cum nulla res sit aeterna, nisi Tu, probatur, quod ipsae devenerint 
in esse dc non esse". Liber Conlemplationis, bk. 2, c. 30, MOG IX, 64. ".. . jam dixi, quod Divina 
Voluntas voluerit, quod creatura de non esse deduceretur in esse". Dispulatio Eremitae et Raymimdi 
super Aliquibus Dubiis Quaestionibus Sententiarum Magislri Petri Lombardi, bk. 2, c. 37, MOG IV, 260 
= Int, iv, 36. 
6 6 See note 41 above. 
6 7 "Utrum... sit Aeternus? Respondendum est, quod non. Ratio huius est, quia factibilis est. Facti-
bilis autem ab aeterno csse non potest; quia si sic, implicarctur contradictio, quod esset factibilis et non 
factibilis". Liber de Forma Dei, ROL VIII, 72. 
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The rational conclusion which asserts unequivocally that the world 
had an absolute beginning was a conclusion accepted by Llull as in perfect 
accord with the truth that he had known and accepted from the early 
years of his life in a sincere Christian faith. Because of that faith, he had 
long before spoken of the world as created and new or non-e te rna l . 6 8 Ra-
tionally to his own satisfaction at least, he had now explained that it can-
not be otherwise. Not because of limits or of a lack of power on the side 
of the infinite and eternal First Cause, but because of the finiteness that 
belongs to the very nature of all that is not the eternal and infinite First 
Being. Created beings would not be the creatures that they are , contin-
gent and finite in every way, down to the roots and foundations of their 
reality, if they actually had , or could even theoretically possess, a truly 
boundless or eternal duration of existence, at least because beginningless. 
The world therefore, has not always existed. It has had a beginning of its 
existence, a beginning which has come after its previous total non-being, 
except as a divine idea within the mind and wisdom of its eternal Creator . 
That divine idea however, has always been and will always be totally one 
with the Divine Rea l i ty . 6 9 It is not , and cannot be , entitatively identical 
and one , in any way whatsoever , with the reality of the entities that cons-
titute the world collectively. T h e start of the world, as well as its transi-
tion and succession from non-being to being must not be imagined or un-
derstood as a beginning, a transition and succession that occurred in or 
with t ime. Time istself only began at and with the beginning of the world. 
We must not, therefore, imagine and think of a time which came before 
the creation of the wor ld . 7 0 According to Llull, when all is said and done , 
neither the world as a whole nor any part or thing of it ever was, or could 
ever have been from all eternity, even if one is willing to say that it was 
created from all eternity. Creat ion, as an act on the part of God producti-
ve of the entire reality of beings distinct or separate from His being and 
na ture , is certainly as eternal as God Himself. 7 1 It cannot be otherwise, 
since any acts performed by the eternal First Being are one and indentical 
with His being in the perfect simplicity and inmutability of the divine es-
sence. But when persons wonder at and speak of an "eternally created 
world" ordinarily, it is not that interior act within the First Being that they 
are thinking about . What is at issue in their minds is not the divine acti-
vity itself whereby God causes His effect ad extra. Ra ther what is in ques-
tion is the possible beginningless duration of the world, admittedly the ef-
fect of God ' s creative act. It is that eternal and beginningless duration that 
68 Libre de Doctrina Pueril, c. 3 (Palma: Imprenta Pere Antoni Cap6, 1736), p. 10. 
69 Disputatio Eremitae et Raymundi, bk. 2, c. 37, MOG IV, 259 = Int. iv, 35. 
711 Liber Contemplationis, bk. 2, c. 30, MOG IX, 64 
71 Disputatio Eremitae et Raymundi, bk. 2, c. 37, MOG IV. 260 = Int. iv, 36. 
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Llull rejects because neither the world nor anything else created and finite 
is ever able to have it, since it is totally excluded from it by its finite and 
contingent character. It goes without saying that according to Llull and 
rightly so, the non-eternal character of the creature does not in any way 
modify or alter either the immutability or eternity of the Creator , simply 
because the nonnecessary creation of finite beings in no way adds to or 
takes anything away from the fulness of God ' s infinite being and perfec-
t i ons . 7 2 
Anothe r very distinct characteristic of Llull's understanding of crea-
tion would seem to be rather obvious from the standpoint of any theist 
who distinguishes clearly the reality of God from that of any other thing 
or being. The denial of that distinction cannot but lead to some sort of 
pantheism or monism, one of the perennial temptat ions before the human 
spirit as borne out by the history of thought and of re l ig ion. 7 3 The aspect 
in the understanding of creation to which we allude now has sometimes 
been overlooked, or at least obscured, by those who seem unable to un-
derstand how a creation ex nihilo, a creation stricto sensu, can ever occur 
because of the difficulties linked to the ex nihilo. As a result, since they 
do not wish to deny altogether the production of the creature by the First 
Being in some way, these men have under taken to derive the reality of 
created being, not from nothing - they declare such a thing an impossibility 
altogether, and rightly so in their incorrect understanding of the state-
m e n t - but from the reality and substance of the First Being. Seen in that 
way, the First Cause actually becomes at least a part of the creature , al-
though some of those men still desire all the while to maintain some kind 
of meaningful distinction between the Creator and the creature. Llull was 
always totally unwilling to compromise in the least the authentic divine 
transcendence. For that reason he was quite emphatic in his insistence on 
the lack of entitative identity between the First Being and the second 
being, between G o d aftd the world or anyhirig of the second being, bet-
ween G o d i a n d t h e wofld or anything of the world, either totally or par-
t ial ly. 7 4 In the creation of anything, the uncaused, infinite and eternal First 
Being brings into being other things that are decidedly finite, contingent 
and non-eternal . Regardless of when and how they exist, if they do so at 
all, all created beings - a n d this means everything other than G o d - owe 
their real being to the uncreated and eternal Being, who as such cannot 
7 2 "... et ita multo melius Deus non capit novitatem in sua aeternitate, quamvis creaverit mundum, 
qui non erat". Liber de Consolatione Eremitae, ROL I, 100. See also Liber de Ente quod Simpliciler Est 
per Se et Propter Se Existens el Agens, d. 3, 3, ROL VIII, 211; and Liber de Forma Dei, ROL VIII, 67. 
7 3 Maritain, op, cit., pp. 29-33, 61-63. 
74 Dispulatio Raymundi Christiani et Hamar Saraceni, p. 2, c. 1, MOG IV, 442 = Int. vii, 12; also 
Metaphysica Nova in ROL VI, 10, 20. 
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be or become created and finite. Literally and in a very real sense, all 
finite beings have proceeded from, or come from nothingness, since their 
being has ultimately followed after their total non-being. They have done 
so therefore, ei ther absolutely when anything other than the Infinite One 
began or begins to exist through its creation stricto sensu; or at least in a 
relative meaning, since their being still has followed after their non-being, 
although admittedly they have been made from, and followed after, anot-
her thing which has in some way turned into them. The Creator alone is 
singularly and uniquely eternal , absolutely necessary, infinite and posses-
sed of the highest simplicity and actuality of be ing . 7 5 Logically therefore, it 
has to be said unhesitatingly, that all things finite, non-eternal , contingent 
and composite in their being are , and will always remain, fundamentally 
distinct from their ult imate eternal and infinite creative cause. The First 
Being on the one hand, and everything else on the other are conse-
quently, infinitely different in their very being: the First Being is eternal 
and infinite; all o ther entities are finite and non-eternal . For. that reason, 
there can be no possible entitative identification in which the substance of 
either becomes literally the essence and substance of the other . 
No mat ter therefore , what it does or what is done to it, a creature or 
created being cannot in its entitative essence ever become the Creator . 
N o r can the eternal Creator on the other hand, be entitatively changed 
into that which has been created and is both finite and non-eternal at 
once: obviously because to do so, H e would have on the one hand always 
been, and on the o ther He would have begun to exist. A contradiction 
would then of course, be given, for the eternal O n e , in order to have be-
gun to be after not being, since supposedly it has beeome a creature , 
would not have been eternally. A strict creation of whatever ts not God 
rules out al together every kind of monism and of pantheism, no mat ter 
how subtly proposed or mitigated. It does so because in all of them, the 
clearcut distinction or duality which distinguishes the Crea tor from the 
creature , the First Being from all that is the second being, the ultimately 
First Efficient Cause from what is in some way a secondary cause and His 
effect, is effectively denied or absorbed in the homogeneous unity of the 
unique reality of the all-pervading O n e . A properly correct creationist ac-
count therefore, one which aims at explaining satisfactorily and well the 
origin of the world, of all that is embraced within the second being, and 
this by way of a creation stricto sensu, must on that account also exclude 
even the semblance of any form of pantheism, including the subtle form of 
pantheism which in history is known as emanat ionism, and even more so 
of course, any other kinds of theis.tic evolutionism, wherein the world and 
Liber Conlemplalionis, bk. 2, c. 30, MOG IX, 260. 
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man are the supreme reality , evolving either eternally or in t ime. More 
than once in his writings, Llull made the decided effort to express positi-
vely and clearly his unders tanding of the unequivocal and radical distinc-
tion that obtains between the eternal and infinite Creator and non-eternal 
and finite creatures. Thus he noted clearly that the ontological distance 
which separates the finite from the infinite is itself infinite or beyond mea-
surement . Not even an infinite addition of the finite to the finite will ever 
yield, or result in, the reality of the truly Infinite One . On that basis, one 
of the reasons which he readily suggested as to why God cannot create an 
eternal world is rooted in the infinite disproportion which obtains between 
what is finite and what is truly infinite. As he says himself: 
Between the infinite and the finite there is no proport ion at 
all. But now, if the Divine Power were to create an eternal 
world, then the world would be the means wherein a propor-
tion would be given between the infinite and the f in i te . 7 6 
The Infinite stands of course, for none other than the absolutely First 
Being, alone both uncreated and eternal. The entire universe, with all that 
we may wish and have to include within the designation of the "second 
being", is non-eternal , created and finite. Obviously and simply as the se-
cond being that it is, the entire universe, with whatever else might be 
thought to exist, is not of itself, per se or a se; ra ther is totally dependent 
on the First being who alone is not through another being or ab alio, but 
per se and a se.11 Everything comprised within the second being is there-
fore, contingent, non-eternal , finite, imperfect, even defective in several 
ways and the entitative result of a basic composition within itself of being 
and non-being, of act and potency, of substance and accidents, and pos-
sibly in other ways. In stark and total contrast on the other hand, the 
First Being is uncaused, supremely actual, infinitely perfect, e ternal , with-
out any composition of any sort, without accidents, and truly infinite in Its 
being and in all of Its perfections. Under such circumstances, how can the 
conclusion be avoided that no entitative identity obtains between whatever 
constitutes the second being and what is the reality of the First Being? 
There is one other way in which Llull makes it quite clear that the 
Creator is not , and cannot be , identical within the reality of His being, 
7 6 "Inter infinitum et finitum est nulla proportio; sed, si divina potestas creasset mundum aeternum, 
esset mundus medium, rationc cujus esset proportio inter infinitum et finitum. cxistcnte mundo limitato 
in omnibus suis extremitatibus excepta sua infinita duratione". Quaesliones per Anem Demonslralivam 
seu Invenlivam Solubiles, q. 30, in MOG IV, 68 = Int. iii, 52. 
77 Metaphysica Nova in ROL VI, 20 
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even partially, with anything of, or with the whole of, the totality of the 
reality of that which he , as noted earlier, at times calls " the second 
being". This other way consists in nothing more than a reminder that all 
the products of a creation stricto sensu - a n d all things other than God 
must be traced ultimately to at least one such creation, immediately or 
mediately, because in the case of all of them, taken collectivelly, their ab-
solute non-being came before their being, until at least with the creation 
of the world something besides God began to exist- have all been made 
or created out of nothing, ex nihilo.18 Precisely as a created being in the 
strict sense of the word, no creature has been made from, or produced 
out of, and with the substance or entitative reality of Him who is the First 
Cause. Had any creature been drawn and made from the very essence and 
being of the First Cause , or of any other. reality for that mat ter , then ob-
viously it would not have been created out of nothing. Rather the reality 
of the supposedly created being would then have been preceded by, and 
been formed out of and with something, with an aliquid, namely the enti-
tative reality of the First Cause. Not only would the being that is simplici-
ter infinite have made itself in some way a finite entity, but also its very 
being and substance would then have served and continue to serve as one 
or more of the intrinsic causes that preceded first, and then became the 
reality of, the second being. The substance of the First Being would then 
itself be either a material or a formal cause, or both, of the substance or 
reality which is the second being. Llull is most emphat ic and clear in his 
repudiation of this type of pantheistic thought. In one of his earliest, im-
pressive and inspiring literary compositions he wrote: "You do not create 
the creatures out of your essence. Ra ther you have created them out of 
nothing. The reason we know that you have not created any creature out 
of yourself i s . . . " 7 9 The words just quoted appear in a chapter of the Book 
of Contemplation that has as its title: " H o w God created creatures out of 
no th ing" . 8 0 Moreover , in three ensuing chapters that follow, albeit not in 
strict consecutive order , the reader is given the occasion to reflect on how, 
also out of nothing, were created a) the original prime matter that subse-
quently became, or was formed into, the substance of the heavens and of 
the innumerable species of all the kinds of physical things that are found 
on the planet man inhabits, as well as possibly on others; b) the rational 
souls of each and every human being at the time of the beginning of the 
existence of each one of them; and c) the exclusively spiritual substances 
7S Liber Contemplationis, bk. I, c. 30. MOG IX, 64. 
7 5 "Tu non creasti creaturas de tua essencia. sed creasti eas ex nihilo; nam id. per quod nos cognos-
cimus, Te non creavisse creaturas de Te ipso Liber Contemplationis, MOG IX, 63. 
8 0 "Ouomodo Deus creaverit creaturas ex nihilo". Loc. cil. 
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ordinarily spoken of as "ange ls" . 8 1 Somewhat distinctly, on the other 
hand, in four other chap te r s x 2 inserted between the two chapters that tell 
us about the creation of the basic prime matter and of the rational souls 
of men, the author outlines the "creat ion" -obviously in a broad or wide 
sense - of a) the heavens, b) the four simplest e lements , c) the various 
types of minerals, d) the many species or kinds of plants, and e) the many 
species of animals, mainly from the standpoint of the physical part of their 
being, inclusive the body of man. Since all the various types of entities 
envisioned in these four chapters were originally formed, at least in a 
good part , not out of simply nothing, but out of the things that had pre-
viously been created, ultimately and more specifically out of the original 
basic matter created out of nothing, we must because of that acknowledge 
that their creation by God was of the sort that we named earlier "creation 
in the wide sense". But of course and as just indicated, the prior thing, or 
things, out of which each of these main types of creatures, namely the 
heavens, the minerals, the species of plants and animals in their first ins-
tances, was originally created, was not the divine substance or essence but 
the prime matter , itself created out of nothing, or the several basic ele-
ments formed with and out of that prime matter . The thought that , in the 
creation of anything stricto sensu, neither the whole of the First Being nor 
anything that might per impossibile be thought as an entitative element or 
part of His being is either transformed into, or passes into and becomes 
entitatively, anything of the reality of the created being is made again very 
clear by Llull in a later book entitled Liber de Anima Rationali. What he 
says there in reply to a question asking "whether the soul is created" ob-
viously holds also in the case of any creation by God. We read: 
A seal leaves behind on the wax the similitudes of the real 
letters in its essence, without the letters (now) present in the 
wax being one with the reality of the letters in the seal. They 
are however, the likenesses and the imprints of those letters. 
In a like fashion, in creation God stamps His likenesses on 
creatures, but not so that creatures are now of the essence of 
God. Rather they are His similitudes, and this insofar as they 
are able to receive and retain those l ikenessess . 8 3 
1 , 1 cc. 31, 36, 37, MOG IX pp. 66, 75, 77. 
8 2 cc. 32-25, MOG IX, pp. 67, 69, 71, 73. 
B "Sigillum relinquit in cera similitudines suarum essentialium literarum, quin literae cerae sint de 
essentia literarum sigilli, sed sunt similitudes et impressiones illarum literarum; similiter in creatione 
Deus imprimit suas similitudines in creaturis, non, quod creaturae sint de essentia Dei, sed sunt similitu-
dines illius, secundum quod ejus similitudines possunt recipere et sustinere". Liber de Anima Rationali, 
MOG VI 422 = Int. vii, 8. 
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The comparison of that occurs with, or is given in, a mirror was ad-
ded by Lull to that of the seal and its letters in a book he wrote four 
years later. In it the author endeavored anew to explain clearly that no-
thing of the reality of the Creator is changed into, or passes into, what is 
the actual substance of the realities which H e admittedly creates. In intro-
ducing the analogy, Llull points out that it is incorrect to think that at 
least the divine exemplar , the idea of each creatable thing within the wis-
dom or mind of G o d , enters into or in any way becomes, at least par-
tially, anything of the essence and reality of the created being. With ap-
proval he recalls that the exemplar or idea has of course, existed eternally 
within the Supreme Intellect. Because of a divine exemplary idea - a n d 
within that same idea, in reality one with the Divine B e i n g - a creature 
may also be said to have existed eternally, before its actual objective pro-
duction and projection into the realm of extramental reality. But of course 
until its creat ion, the creature only has a cognitional being within a divine 
idea of it. Until its creation, it does not exist on its own at all. In any 
case, since God ' s knowledge and ideas are eternally one with God ' s essen-
ce, the eternal divine idea of each thing does not at all become either an 
intrinsic partial principle or the whole of the reality of any created being. 
This is how Llull expresses his non-pantheistic understanding of creation in 
the later book: 
The image or figure which appears on a mirror is present in 
that mirror which receives that image from outside, without 
yielding anything of its own reality and na ture ; much like a 
seal which passes onto the wax its own characters , yet placing 
outside of itself nothing of its reality. H e likewise asserted 
that the world and its parts have been from all eternity within 
the divine intellect by means of one or more ideas, without 
the divine intellect placing outside of itself anything of its 
own reality and na ture , nor of the being of its at tr ibutes. 
Hence , when God created the world, H e placed, outside of 
Himself nothing of the being of the idea. For had he done so, 
the idea would have been al tered, and would not have been 
e t e rna l . 8 4 
8 4 "Imago vel figura, quae apparet in speculo, est in speculo, quod ab extra recipit illam imaginem 
nihil extra mittendo de sua essentia et natura; sicut sigillum, quod in ceram transmittit suum characte-
rem nihil extra mittendo de esse suae essentiae: item dixit, quod mundus et partes ejus ab aeterno 
fuerint in intellectu divino per ideam vel ideas, intellectu divino nihil extra mittente de sua essentia et 
natura, nec de esse essentiae suorum attributorum: unde quando Deus creavit mundum, nihil de esse 
ideae in creando extra se misit; quia si transmisisset. idea esset alterata, et non aeterna; quod est impos-
sibile. cum idea sit Deus". Disputatio Eremitae, bk. 2, c. 37, MOG IV, 259 = Int. iv. 35. 
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The last two quotat ions show clearly that , according to Llull, to enter-
tain the thought that the divine reality in some way passes or changes in-
to , and consequently becomes, at least in par t , somet of the world and 
man , is to think that one can do away with, and discard al together, the 
entitatively real distance and ontological difference that obtain between 
two orders of being infinitely diverse: that of the First Being who is infini-
te , e ternal , immutable , altogether uncaused and pure actuality on the one 
hand; and on the other , that of everything else which of necessity is finite, 
non-eternal , mutable , caused and which has in different degrees composi-
tion of potency and act, and of being and non-being, because drawn from 
sheer nothingness at the moment of its first creation. By removing and 
doing away with the ontological gap and distinction between the eternal 
and the non-eternal , between the infinite and the finite, between the crea-
tive uncaused cause and the created effect, a person is effectively reducing 
one to the o ther within his thought , so that in a resultant radical identity 
one has no longer two infinitely distinct orders of being, but only one . 
Obviously, in the end this reduction and identification yield nothing more 
than some kind of monism and pantheism, totally at odds , not to say to-
tally incompatible, with the conception of the First Being, correctly defen-
ded within classical theism and monotheism of traditionally or thodox 
Christian thinkers. It is within the ranks of these or thodox Christian thin-
kers that we discover the rather delightful figure of the Majorcan philo-
sopher, in spite of occasional strong attacks on his orthodoxy by a few of 
his detractors , down through the centuries since near the end of the four-
teenth century. 
Men who unders tand the creation of the world in a strict sense and 
therefore, ex nihilo, must also hold of necessity that until the creation of 
the first things o ther than God , until the creation and first appearance of 
anything compris.ed within the second being which we name ordinarily the 
"universe" of finite being, until and before that creation only the First 
Being was or existed, eternally of course, and not in t ime, which only be-
gan at the start of the existence of beings subject to change, in any of its 
various possible forms. Consequently, eternally and until the first moment 
that came with the creation of beings not God , nothing distinct from and 
outside of the First Being existed; nothing that might have been used as a 
material cause, in order to make with it, and out of it, the things that 
became the world or any other created entity, within or outside of it. Out-
side of God and before the original instant of creation, there was simply 
nothing that could have been changed into, and that could thereby have 
become, a principle or the substance of any creature. W e saw above also 
that the divine substance or essence cannot itself ever become anything of 
the reality, or one of the intrinsic principles, either material or formal, 
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which are or constitute what is comprised within the second being, within 
the totality of things other than the creative First Cause , i.e. the universe 
of created being. As far as the material or physical world with all the 
physical substances or bodies on it - including human bod ies - is concerned, 
there was no pre-existent matter or material , no material cause or causes 
that might have been utilized by the Creator towards and in the creation 
of the individual things that made up that world originally. The material 
cause, or mat ter , and whatever other intrinsic principles lie at the roots 
and heart of anything with an objective reality in the physical world, both 
in the order of substantial and of accidental being, had to receive their 
being totally and for the first t ime at creation, for they themselves began 
to exist only when things other than God first began. The so-called prime 
mat ter of the philosophers, the most elemental or basic underlying subject 
that is present in and becomes all the natural bodies of the world through 
successive substancial changes, had to be created, perhaps bet ter had to 
be concreated, with the first physical things created when the world itself 
was first c r ea t ed . 8 5 It had to be created stricto sensu, or concreated with 
those first things, because absolutely nothing, without excluding the prime 
mat ter out of which all physical things of the world are entitatively consti-
tude , had any objective reality, outside of and besides the First Being; 
certainly not until the first creation of any of the entities that collectively 
constitute the physical world and are therefore comprised within the se-
cond being. Admit tedly, it is far from an easy mat ter to unders tand how 
the fact of creation stricto sensu is possible, as demonstra ted historically by 
the failure of so many first rate philosophers to recognize it. None of 
them apparently could even imagine that anything, including the material 
principles that enter into the entitative constitution of anything physical in 
the world, could possibly be made out of simply nothing ex nihilo, and not 
ex aliquo or out of something else. Undoubtedly , as noted earlier, "crea-
t ion", strictly taken , names more than just an extraordinary production 
and type of making things rarely experienced in the normal course of 
events in nature and the world. It is actually a supernatural work which 
calls for powers beyond those possessed by nature and man , indeed by 
any finite entity. Indubitably, because creation, strictly taken, is so much 
more than and so different from, anything that finite beings might be able 
to accomplish, ancient philosophers in general and some recent ones - ig-
norant of, or unwilling to accept, the authoritat ive truth of Sacred Scrip-
t u r e - were incapable of even suspecting the creation of the world ex nihi-
lo. Indeed in many cases, they denied it, at least implicitly, by their expli-
cit acceptance of the necessary and eternal existence of the world, of its 
mat ter and of its mot ions , as did Aristotle. U p to the present day, many 
of those who still reject the creation of the world stricto sensu frequently 
85 Liber Contemplationis, bk. 2, c. 31, MOG IX, 66. 
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defend their stand with the old assertions that "from nothing nothing ever 
came" and that "out of nothing simply nothing c o m e s " . 8 6 And indeed, un-
less properly unders tood, it must be admitted that those assertions appear 
prima facia undeniable . One or two clarifications are in order if we are to 
unders tand them properly. Otherwise they may seem unanswerable objec-
tions to a rational understanding of the possibility of creation. Ramon 
Llull, for example, conscious and keenly unaware of the fact that the ob-
jection had already been raised in ancient t imes, tried to dispose of it by 
immediately noting that we must stop thinking of "noth ing" as if nothing 
were some kind of thing, as if it were something. Nothing clearly is not 
something. Ra the r it is the total absence of anything that has any positive 
reality or being. Precisely because it is not anything at all, obviously what 
is really signified by "nothing" cannot be made use of as if it were an 
instrument or a material of some sort with which and out of which one 
might make some one thing. We must therefore, make the effort to avoid 
thinking of "nothing" as if it were a "something" , as if it were named by 
an "i t" in which "it" stands for a positive principle or reality, out of which 
and with which the world might have been created, as with a material of 
some sort. In this regard Llull counsels that we refrain from taking "no-
thing" materialiter, because nothing is not something that can function or 
act as a material cause or as any other cause. T h e objection implied in the 
above assertions seems to suggest this type of thinking and rightly notes 
that "nothing" cannot be used in order to make something, either with in 
or out of it. For the same basic reason, neither can "noth ing" itself be 
turned into something by whatever sort of change one may choose. But 
little thought is actually needed to realize that it is a total misconception 
to deal with "nothing" as if it were something, as it were at least a mate-
rial cause of some sort. In Llull's last expressly anti-Averroistic writing be-
fore he left Paris, the scene of the early fourteenth century bir th, or resur-
gence, of the Latin Averroist movement , we come across these words: 
To the third reason that asserts that "out of nothing nothing 
is m a d e " this must be answered: materially (yes), because 
then nothing would already be something. But a Catholic says 
that what is (thus) made was (before) neither in potency nor 
in ac t . 8 7 
These maxims hold for any natural production by finitc beings. Llull shows he takes thcm se-
riously with "Natural Proverbs" he proposes in Liber Proverbiorum, p. 2, c. 1. MOG VI, 325 = Int. vi, 
43. 
8 7 "Ad tertiam quod de nihilo nihil fit, respondendum est: Materialiter, quia iam nihil esset aliquid. 
Sed Catholicus dicit, quod fit, quod non erat in potentia nec in actu". Lib. de Enle, d. 4, 3 in ROL 
VIII, 211. 
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If we are going to think and speak of creation correctly, we must 
make the conscious effort therefore, to keep always in mind that "not-
hing" does not stand for anything positively real at all. The fact that "not-
hing" nei ther is nor contains anything positive at all in any meaningful 
way, that it is not a positive reality and that therefore, it does not have 
any being of its own at all, not even potentially, is what renders creation 
stricto sensu so radically different from any other instance and kind of ma-
king whereof men can have experience in the world. The total negative 
character of "nothing" provides probably one of the strongest reasons, as 
suggested by the above cited nearly axiomatic assertions, that explain in 
good measure the ignorance, and even denial , of the creation of the world 
by God ex nihilo by so many otherwise capable thinkers. Almost certainly, 
it was the consciousness of this sad fact that caused Llull to expand a little 
m o r e , in another of his writings, on the thought which he later expressed 
in the reply to the objection by Averroes quoted last. In the book inten-
ded by the author as the last and definitive version of his famous Ar t , the 
Ars Generalis Ultima, he had earlier written: 
It is stated furthermore in philosophy that from nothing no-
thing is made . In order to explain this authority. . . we explain 
that nothing is not a principle. For were it such, then nothing 
would already be something. Again. . . nothing is not the mat-
ter for (making) something, for if out of it something could 
be made , it already would be something. Again. . . if it were 
subject to anything, it would also be something. . . nor can 
nothing be a means , for it were one , then it would already be 
something. . . we understand that nothing cannot be either a 
material , or a formal, or an efficient or a final cause. Nor can 
it be endowed with any power at all. For if it were , then it 
would be someth ing . 8 8 
This s tatement by the philosopher, as well as the shorter one cited 
before, establishes beyond doubt that he was aware of the care that is 
called for in order to understand first, and secondly to dispose properly of 
the difficulties that our intellect may appear to encounter when faced with 
the t ruth of the creation of the world. These difficulties, as well as the 
"Ulterius legitur in philosophia. quod de nihilo nihil fit. Ad exponendum autoritatem istam... 
exponimus... quod nihil non est principium; quia si sic, jam nihil, aliquid esset. Item..., quod nihil non 
est materia ad aliquid. Hoc idem intelligitur...; si enim nihil esset subditum alicui. aliquid quidem es-
set... nec nihil medium habere potest, quia si haberet, jam esset aliquid... intelligimus quod nihil non 
potest esse causa materialis. formalis, efficiens, nec finalis. atque de nulla potestate habituatum; quia si 
esset, jam sequerctur quod esset aliquid". Ars Generalis, P. 7, c. 5. ed. cit. pp. 99-100. 
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objections raised by some men on account of them, are in a great measure 
due to a simple fact, namely that it is not easy to grasp with our under-
standing how any efficient cause can possibly bring it about that something 
be made or produced without a prior substance or principle that is utilized 
and changed, in order to make or create the new thing. Llull realized 
rather well that the rational grasp of the truth of the total creation of 
anything, of creation stricto sensu, strains the powers of the intellect to its 
limits. As a cognitive power, the intellect finds itself at home with that 
which in some way is, with that which possesses being, with being which, 
as realist philosophers maintain, is the adequate object of the intellect as a 
supra-sensory cognitive power. Consequently, we are able to unders tand 
to some degree at least, we can intellectually know at least a little, only 
that which shares in being in some way or measure , for only if something 
is can it be presented and given as an object to our intellect. What is 
literally "nothing," as said earlier, is not anything at all. It does not, the-
refore, provide our power of understanding with anything that it is able to 
understand and know at all. If we speak, and therefore appear to think, 
of "nothing" it is be.cause, aided by that word, we at tempt to think and to 
speak of the total removal and absence of whatever is something as best 
we can. Tha t we do so the etymology of the word used in English (and 
possibly in other languages) plainly suggests. We might say that in a sense, 
in our thoughts and language, we turn nothing into something. If we keep 
such things in mind, we can bet ter understand that to think of creation as 
the production or the making of something out of nothing is not the 
easiest thought for the human intellect to grasp, clearly because we have a 
transition from the previous total non-being or nothingness of a thing to 
its being. As a result of his early at tempts to wrestle with the problem of 
the creation- of the world Llull wrote in one of his earliest literary compo-
sitions: 
But as to the manner how God makes a thing to be out of 
nothing, the human intellect cannot unders tand it in a created 
object. D o you know why? Because the intellect understands 
nothing in what is nothing. And because the intellect cannot 
understand how a thing can be made out of that in which it 
understands nothing, for that reason you cannot understand it 
in that in which you understand no th ing . 8 9 
m "Modum tamen, quomodo Deus ex nihilo producat aliquid, humanus intellectus non potest inte-
lligere; et scis, quare? Quia in nihilo non potest intellectus aliquid intelligere; et quia intellectus non 
potest intelligere, quomodo ex hoc fiat aliquid, in que nihil potest intelligere, ideo non potes intelligere 
in eo, in quo nihil intelligis". Liber de Cemili, bk. 2, art 2, MOG II, 48 = Int. ii, 28. 
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Whatever difficulties the human mind meets with in its endeavors to 
know, and unders tand at least a little, the truth regarding the creation of 
the world out of nothing can be more than adequately resolved, if only 
one has recourse to and is mindful of the infinity of the Creator ' s power. 
Nothing less than an infinite power is both necessary and sufficient to 
bridge the immeasurable and practically infinite gap that separates total 
nothingness from the realm of be ing . 9 0 Only an infinite reality possessed 
of an absolutely infinite and ordered active p o w e r 9 1 can efficiently cause 
something to be which up to its creation is simply nothing in itself, be-
cause totally devoid of any kind of objective being. In order to effect the 
transition from total non-being to being (and this is the character and 
meaning of creation stricto sensu), it is therefore, required that the Crea-
tor be possessed of an infinite power. It is of course, an obviously unde-
niable fact that the powers man finds himself in possession of, as well as 
all the powers he knows belong to the remainder of things that populate 
the universe at large, are finite, all of them, simply because they are part 
of the natural equipment possessed by entities, finite both in being and in 
na ture . Experience and observations confirm the fact that both men and 
other natural agents found in the world are endowed with the necessary 
effective, or efficient, power to bring other things into being, even for the 
first t ime, since frequently these new things cannot reasonably be thought 
to have existed before, except perhaps as an idea in somebody's intellect 
or mind. It is fact that thus are produced new substances, animate and 
inanimate, which as new make their first appearance in the world, either 
as a result of biological reproductions or through the occurrence of some 
other kind of truly substantial change. These instances, as well as all those 
which occur ordinarily and extraordinarily in na ture , wherein a new reality 
or substance begins to be after its previous non-existence individually, are 
instances of creations, but only in a wide sense. It must be said so, becau-
se we cannot in any of those numerous instances say that the new substan-
ces came from simply out of nothing. The experienced and undeniable po-
wer of efficiently causing new entities which all natural agents, including 
man , possess can only be exercised or be put to work if an antecedently 
existing thing is given, which the efficient cause can turn into, or make 
into , the new thing. The previously existing thing has to be changed, even 
destroyed or corrupted, in order to be formed into the new thing. With 
the exception of thinkers inclined towards occasionalism, no thinker who 
recognizes the objectivity of the world of extramental reality, about which 
"Et quia esse et non esse habent distantiam infinitam..." Ars Consilii, d. 3, ROL II, 226. 
9 1 The title of one of LlulPs opuscula written at Messina less than three years before his death is 
Liber de lnfmilu el Ordinala Poiestale. With other Opera Messaniensia, it has been critically edited by 
Johannes Stdhr in ROL I, 237-62. 
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we know normally and mainly with our senses, will want to challenge the 
truth that both men and other natural agents, about which we know from 
experience, can be and frequently are authentic efficient causes. These 
agents therefore, have the power to produce , to make and to create so-
mething new, something that was previously non-existent, but always ex 
aliquo, always out of some previous thing or materials. The natural agents 
or efficient causes of the world act on those materials or things, and they 
change them either substantially or accidentally. In every instance of a 
production by these natural agents and causes a prior subject, substance 
or material is given and it functions as in the role of a material cause out 
of which the efficient cause brings the new thing. It is undoubtedly , in 
ways much as this that natural agents in the world are said to create . Ob-
viously they do so only in a wide sense, since in every instance in which 
they create they do so only through changing some old or prior material 
or thing and by forming it into the new th ing . 9 2 No natural agent howe-
ver, without the exclusion of man, has been observed or known, indeed 
has the power , to create stricto sensu, to bring something into being totally 
and simpliciter from out of its previous total nothingness or non-being. It 
is perhaps partially on account of this unexperienced, indeed non-expe-
rientiable, character of strict creations, particularly if added to the very 
real difficulty which the human mind experiences in trying to grasp somet-
hing in what is nothing, as noted earlier, that so many philosophers -many 
of them totally ignorant and oblivious of the teaching of creation from re-
ligious sources originally, we k n o w - have remained unaware and someti-
mes have denied outright the very possibility of creation stricto sensu. We 
cannot but agree, as a mat ter of fact, that such a creation is an impossibi-
lity from the standpoint of purely natural agents, possessed only of finite 
powers because of their finite na tu re s 9 3 . W e have already indicate that no 
finite being has the necessary and sufficient power to bring something into 
being out of and from absolutely total nothingness, simply because it takes 
an infinitely great deal more than finite powers to effect the transition 
from non-being into being. If we must admit that we have not had, and 
cannot have, any experience at all of any creations stricto sensu, it has to 
be obviously because our experiences are only of finite natural agents. 
Precisely because they are finite, all natural and human agents lack the 
necessary infinite power to create in that strict sense. Indeed were God 
also no more than the highest conceivable finite being with the highest 
finite power, we would have to declare that He also cannot bring about a 
single creation stricto sensu. Such a creation would then have to 
'- All of this was explained earlier in the first part of this paper. See note 11 above. 
13 Liber proverbiorum, bk. 2, c. 1, MOG VI, 325 = Int. vi, 43. 
RAMON LLULL'S CONCEPT OF CREATION 57 
be declared a total impossibility because of the non-existence of an Infini-
te Being endowed with infinite power. It is a fact of course that a number 
of people , including philosophers in our times, will not admit of any deity 
except it be a finite one . Such men appear unable or unwilling to conceive 
of anything except of what is finite. For that reason since they cannot re-
cognize G o d except in finite terms, they have also to deny perforce the 
creation of the world ex nihilo. Theirs is not of course, the correct unders-
tanding of God , at least certainly not according to classical theism. But if 
such men , or any man for that mat te r , are to ascend with their minds to 
the recognition of a First Cause , infinite both in being and in power , so-
mething else is probably needed because presupposed, namely that they 
be willing to admit that human knowledge is not simply a matter of sheer 
sense experience and the imagination exclusively. Within the scale of re-
ality man in superior to the brute animals in part because with his rationai 
knowledge he can ascend to some knowledge of the purely intelligible. 
The intimate connection between the recognition of man 's genuine intel-
lectual cognitive power on the one hand and the capacity to think of a 
reality that is infinite on the other , was insisted on by Llull against the 
early fourteenth century Latin followers of Averroes at Paris. Since they 
remained Christians, those Latin Averroists professed to accept, in virtue 
of their faith, the truth of God ' s infinite being and power. But as philo-
sophers using their reason, they wished to reiterate Averroes ' contention 
that , according to sound rational philosophy, which both he and they prac-
tically identified with Aristotle 's thought , we cannot but declare that the 
First Being is a finite being, endowed with extremely limited powers , if 
any, to effect anything outside of His own reality. Strongly opposing 
them, Llull addressed them in this fashion: 
Because you do not extend your knowledge beyond the sen-
ses and the imagination, which are limited powers , you are 
really incapable of thinking of any infinite object . . . And con-
sequently, you place your intellect under constraint . . . and 
consider God finite in His goodness, grandeur, power and His 
other at tr ibutes. . . Let such a small god, defective in all of his 
rationes be yours and not mine, because he is not sufficient 
for me. I have another G o d . 9 4 
"Quoniam tu Averroista. non extendis tuam scientiam extra scnsum et imaginationem, quae sunt 
potentiae finitae, objectare non posses objecta infinita realiter,... et sic ligas intellectum tuum, ut non 
transeat super sensum et imaginationem, et consideras Deum finitum quoad suam bonitatem, magnitudi-
nem, potestatem, et etiam quoad alia principia... Talis autem Deus ita parvus, defectivus per omnes 
suas rationes sit tuus; meus autem non; quia non esset mihi sufficiens, quoniam alium Deum habeo, 
quem intelligo super sensum et imaginationem". Disputatio Raimtmdi et Averroistae, 3, ed. Hermogenes 
Harada in ROL VII, 13. 
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According to the Majorcan philosopher, to conceive God as a finite 
entity, with simply nothing more than limited perfections and powers , is 
simply to think of a god that is unreal and no more than a mathematical 
abstraction. Certainly, such a mathematically abstract god is quite different 
from the God affirmed by an authentic monotheism. Of any supposedly 
finite divinities, Llull would not hesitate to declare: 
Such a god we shall not call God, except possibly a mathema-
tical one . A n d in him we do not believe, because he does not 
exist, and no one is obliged to believe in him, since he per-
forms not one single good thing. Instead he rather allows all 
sort of evil things to occur . 9 5 
So crucial and important is, within Llull's thought , the acceptance of 
God ' s infinite being and power for the correct understanding of the crea-
tion of the world and of the t ruths linked intimately with God , that he 
devoted two of his treatises against Averroism to a presentat ion and de-
fense first, of God 's infinite reality and secondly, of God 's infinite power. 
As he composed those two books , as well as the rest of his other anti-
Averroistic treatises, Llull was fully aware that his contemporary followers 
of the famous Arabian commenta tor of Aristotle had, following the lead 
of their master of more than a century earlier, resurrected amongst other 
things the ancient Aristotelian and non-Christian idea of an eternal and 
uncreated universe. Llull's Averroist contemporaries claimed to do so phi-
losophically and under the leadership of Averroes , they denied, more une-
quivocally than Aristotle did in his extant writings of seventeen centuries 
earlier, that it can be rationally demonstrated that the divine power is infi-
nite and that God is the First efficient cause of the wor ld . 9 6 Indubitably, 
with these Averroistic ideas and denials much in his mind, Llull outlined 
his understanding of a) the existence of an Infinite Being in his Liber de 
Ente Infinito97 and b) of the limitless active power that belongs to that 
Infinite Being in the book entitled Liber de Possibili et Impossibili.98 So 
much importance did Llull assign to the question of God ' s infinite power 
that he returned to it at some relative length in most of the twenty-nine 
extant anti-Averroistic opuscula, written during the two years of his last 
"Talem autem Deum dicemus non esse Deum, nisi forte mathematicum; et in talem non credi-
mus, quia non est, neque aliquis debet credere, cum nihil boni faciat et cuncta mala sustineat". Liber in 
quo Declaratur, quod Fides Sancla Catholica est Magis Probabilis quam Improbabilis, prol., ed. Helmut 
Riedlinger in ROL VI, 337. 
9 6 Riedlinger, op. cit. in ROL V, 33. 
9 7 Ed. by Helmut Riedlinger in ROL VI, 93-115. 
9 8 Ed. by Helmut Riedlinger also in ROL VI, 383-466. 
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sojourn at Paris, immediately after he became aware of the recent rise, or 
resurgence, of the Latin Averroism. Unlike the Averroists whom he 
strongly opposed in the late years of his rich and active life, Llull accepted 
and always took into account earnestly the infinity of God 's being and 
power, from the start of his philosophical and literary career. As a conse-
quence , he was soon able within his own mind to surmount apparent diffi-
culties and to achieve an adequately rational understanding of the truth of 
the creation of the world, which he had previously and sincerely accepted 
on the basis of his Christian faith. Soon he came also to the realization 
that what, in most cases, ultimately prevented philosophers from accepting 
the same truth was their ignorance, and possibly denial, of the infinity of 
the divine power. Accordingly he wrote in an early book: 
But because the philosophers did not have a perfect knowled-
ge of the divine power, wisdom, will and other perfections, 
and because they saw that the heavens and the heavenly bo-
dies are incorruptible, on account of these reason they were 
of the opinion that they are eternal , without beginning or 
end. For the same reason also they denied c r ea t i on . " 
He also realized at the same time on the other hand, that a correct 
understanding of the divine at tr ibutes, one of them the divine power, ena-
bled theists generally to recognize at least the possibility of creation. On 
that vein he added to the words just quoted: 
But in the perfect divine will, endowed with perfect power 
and perfect wisdom, it is possible to understand that God can 
create something out of nothing, since His will can so will, 
and His power so make it, and His wisdom likewise knows 
how to ma-ke i t . 1 ( ) ( ) 
Nothing is given either presently in existence or that may possibly be 
some day, nothing either in a state of actuality or a state of potentiality, 
which is now or can ever be capable of preventing or effectively obstruc-
ting the exercise of the infinite power of the Supreme Being. The reason 
"Veruntamen quia philosophi non habuerunt perfectam notitiam divinae potestatis, voluntatis et 
sapientiae, nec earum perfectionis, et viderunt, quod firmamentum et corpora caelestia sint incorruptibi-
lia, igitur opinati sunt, quod ea sint aeterna et sine principio et fine; et ideo moti fuerunt ad negandam 
creationem, omnium rerum procedentium a Deo". Liber de Genlili, b. 2, c. 2, MOG II, 48 = Int. ii, 28. 
1 0 0 "Veruntamen in perfecta voluntate divina, quae habet perfectam potestatem et sapientiam, potes 
intelligere, Deum posse creare aliquid ex nihilo; ex quo sua voluntas potest illud velle, et sua potestas 
potest facere, et sua scientia scit illut facere et creare". Loc. cil. 
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of course, is simply that things which are not God , whether real or only 
possible, whether actual or potential , are all finite in their being and con-
sequently, in their power also. Obviously, beings possessed, singly and co-
llectively, of powers that are only finite cannot prove much of an obstacle 
to Him who is absolute power and wisdom. Now if nothing finite - b u t 
which is at least something in some w a y - exists or can ever exist which is 
capable of preventing the infinite First Being from bringing about and ac-
complishing whatever his boundless wisdom may dictate, how can that 
which theoretically is absolutely nothing at all and therefore has and can 
have no powers at all, not even the power of the least and most insignifi-
cant finite being, whatever it may be. Obviously "nothing" does not have 
the least of p o w e r s 1 0 1 or of anything wherewith it might obstruct or impe-
de the creative designs and power of Him who is absolutely infinite, both 
in being and in perfection. On that account, in a book written on African 
soil, not more than a few months before his death which apparently resul-
ted both from advanced age and physical mal t reatment received in return 
for an outspoken defense of the Christian faith, Ramon Llull was able to 
argue that if God did not have the power to create things out of nothing, 
then all things must have been in some way eternal , either in actuality or 
at least in a condition of potentiality, through some eternal subject, or 
subjects, able to be changed into them. Only in that case however, with 
all of His infinite perfections, among them a perfect goodness, magni tude, 
eternity and power, God still cannot create a single thing out of nothing, 
H e cannot create an aliquid ex nihilo. Moreover , if the First Being does 
not have the power to create ex nihilo, we then have no choice but to 
declare that "His power, which is said to be infinite, is impeded by a 
power which is n o t h i n g " . 1 0 2 But this is manifestly an impossibility, Llull 
will remind us immediately, as he had done a little earlier against Aver-
roes. The Arabian Commenta tor , as understood by Llull, had held a cen-
tury earlier that God lacks the power to create anything out of nothing, 
noting at the same time that only what is neither in act nor in potency is 
simply nothing. God however, can create out of that which was previously 
in some way, either in act or in potency. What is 'nothing' escapes God ' s 
power, simply because it is nothing, either actually or potentially. With 
this in mind, Llull wrote: "But to this it must be replied that the divine 
power for the reason that it is absolute, extends to all three te rms. . . 
"Intclligimus quod nihil... de nulla potcstate potest esse habituatum; quia si esset, jam sequcre-
tur quod esset aliquid". Ars Generulis, 7, c. 5, ed. cil. p. 100. 
1 ( 1 2 "Si omne potens est aeternum in potentia vel actu, Deus cum sua potestate infinita, creare rem 
de nihilo iam non potest. Et potestas, quae est et dicitur infinita, est impedita potestate, quae nihil est; 
quod est impossibile." Liber de Deo et Suis Propriis Qualitmibus Infinitis, ROL II, 285. 
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three terms being a) what is in act, b) what is in potency and c) what is 
n o t h i n g ) . " 1 0 3 
In concert with classical theism, Llull insists on the infinity of power 
characteristic of a Infinite Being. It is because of it that H e can create 
stricto sensu. For the same reason, the First being stands in no need of 
anything or of anyone apart from Himself in order to be able to exercise 
His power to create . Unlike all other efficient causes which are finite and 
hence only have a finite power, the First Cause is in absolutely no need of 
any prior materials on which to work, or of any instruments and collabo-
rators with which to work , in order to effectively create. Indeed before 
the first creation of anything outside the First Cause, there existed no ma-
terials, no instruments or any other agents on which the First Cause might 
have relied and which might have served in any of the capacities indica-
ted, as it w e r e 1 0 4 . That is precisely why in initial creation of anything that 
was not G o d , in the creation of what we ordinarily speak of as the 
"world" and of any purely spiritual beings, their creation had to be ex 
nihilo. With this thought before his mind Llull reasoned that there are two 
basically distinct ways in which God can make and act on things. Correctly 
he argued that G o d 
can act on creatures in either of two ways: immediately or 
mediately. . . Immediately, when He brings forth a creature 
out of non-being into being. Mediately, when through one 
creature H e conserves another , as for example when God 
through the motion of the heavens, itself a creature , conser-
ves the motion of the elements and of the things possessed of 
an elemental na ture , which are also creatures . . . Whence one 
thing is creation and another conse rva t ion . 1 0 5 
Always conscious of the extent of God ' s infinite power, Llull had no 
difficulty in concluding that the divine goodness, truly one in being with 
the power and other infinite perfections of the Supreme Being, "is both 
subjectively and objectively the ordinative and formative cause of all good 
103 "Averrois autem negavit, quod Deus non potest de nihilo aliquid; et consideravit, quod illud. 
quod non est in actu nec in potentia, est nihil,- Sed ad hoc respondendum est, quod divina potestas, 
per hoc quod est absoluta, ambit omnes tres terminos..." Sermones Contra Errores Averrois, ROL VII, 
254. 
104 Liber Contemplalionis, bk. 2, c. 30, MOG IX, 64. 
1 0 5 "Deus agit in creaturis duobus modis, immediate et mediate...; immediate, quando producit 
creaturam de non esse in esse; mediate, quando cum una creatura conservat aliam; sicus Deus, qui cum 
motu coeli. qui est creatura, conservat motum elementorum et elementatorum, quae etiam sunt creatu-
rae... unde... unum est creatio, et aliud conservatio". Dispulatio Eremitae et Raymundi, q. 38, MOG 
IV, 260 = Int. iv, 36. 
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things. Subjectively, this entails creation, i.e. the making of something 
that was not either in act or in potency out of n o t h i n g " . 1 0 6 Since, as noted 
a few lines before, the First Being has the power to act directly and im-
mediately on creatures , and since, moreover , His power is absolutely infi-
ni te , it can be readily understood how in a strict creat ion, although not 
exclusively necessarily, the influence and effects of His efficiently causal 
actions are received immediately from Him by the creatures He creates, 
without the need of any intermediary agents and efficient causes. This 
need of intermediate causes was again taught at Paris in the early four-
teenth century by Averroists , obviously under the influence of Neo-Plato-
nic Arabian philosophy. At the start of a book intended to show, against 
Averroes and others , that God is the immediate efficient cause of the 
world, and not simply its final cause as proposed by Aristotle and his Ara-
bian Commenta to r , Llull declared in terms that leave no doubt as to his 
own thought: " G o d is the efficient cause, and the entire universe is His 
ef fec t" . 1 0 7 By reason of a - c rea t ion strictly unders tood, God is the imme-
diate efficient cause of the total substance and reality of any entity He 
might have chosen to create. Any creature that is truly such because it has 
been created stricto sensu, whether it be a spiritual substance, as an angel 
or a rational soul, or the material things at the beginning of the world 
with mat ter itself, had to be produced totally and immediately by the First 
Efficient Cause who alone has the power to create out of nothing, as 
shown above. Only if an entity is created stricto sensu, is it then created 
out of nothing, totally and immediately by the First Being. After stating 
that God is truly the efficient cause of the whole universe, Llull further 
explains that only in that fashion could God have been truly the First 
Cause. What he then says about the angel, he applies to the other princi-
pal parts of the universe in the ensuing pages of the book establishing 
God ' s efficient causality vis-a-vis the world. About the angel he says: 
A n d it is said that it was entirely made because it was made 
out of nothing, which is not something in act or something in 
potency. Whatever has been made out of something that was 
before either in act or potency, h a s n o t been made simpliciter 
but only secundum quid on the supposition that a being in act 
or in potency has existed eternally. Nor would H e then be 
the absolutely First Cause and End. And that is imposs ib le . 1 0 8 
106 "Probatum est... quod divina bonitas est causa ordinativa et formativa subjective et objective 
omnium aliarum bonitatum. Subjective autem importat creationem, hoc est facere aliquid de nihilo. 
quod non erat, neque in potentia, neque in actu"; Liber de Forma Dei, d. 2, in ROL VIII, 59. 
m "Raimundista dicebat, quod Deus est efficiens, et totum universum est effectus eius". Liber de 
Efficiente et Effecttt, prol., ed. Hermogenes Harada in ROL VII, 274. 
108 . . ^ j consequentiam istius sequitur, quod angelus sit totus factus sive creatus de nihilo, et quod 
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A point defended with almost complete unanimity by Christian thin-
kers who have reflected on the creation of the world is the further thought 
of the unconditionally free character of creation, and of any creat ion, on 
the part of the First C a u s e . 1 0 9 Accordingly, most of them have rejected 
outright the slightest indication which may suggest without qualifications 
the presence at creation of any determining necessity whereby God ' s total 
freedom and perfect t ranscendence would be compromised. Any kind of 
meaningful absolute necessity to create would cast doubts about the total 
ofherness and the perfect self-sufficiency in goodness of the eternal and 
infinite First Being. A supremely perfect being, a Being who therefore, 
possesses the perfection of being and every other perfection in their high-
est possible superlative degree , i.e. to infinity, the First Being neither 
lacks anything nor can add anything to His nature that might in the least 
enhance it or improve it. Were the First Being in need of the least possi-
ble thing, He would then not be the eternally immutable and infinitely 
perfect being. In possession in perfect simplicity of every possible perfec-
tion in their highest possible degree, which as just said is no different than 
to infinity, God requires or needs absolutely nothing in order to be fully 
and eternally what He is. Therefore , there is nothing, and there has been 
nothing, outside of Him that can require or compel Him to create one 
single thing outside of, or apart from, the reality of His own being. Such 
being the case, if eternally the First Being chose to create the world, He 
did so simply because he has willed to do so in absolute freedom, because 
in His over-abundantly generous goodness His perfect will freely inclined 
Him to bestow existence and other perfections on other entities besides 
Himself, according to the designs of His perfect wisdom and love. 
In addition to the more or less obvious reasons which convincingly 
show God ' s absolute and total freedom vis-a-vis all that eternally He has 
chosen to create ad extra, the Majorcan philosopher was fond of insisting 
on another factor which is singularly suggestive of his rather original way 
of understanding the active character of the nature of the First Being and 
of his unique way of expressing that active na ture . From the start of his 
literary activity, Llull's concept of the First Being encourages us to think 
of a Divine Being who is infinitely and immanently dynamic, active and 
productive, all within the interior of God ' s infinite nature and reality. If 
God is the supremely Perfect Being who stands in need of nothing which 
He must perforce create outside of His perfect Being, it is largely due to 
Deus sit efficiens... Et dicitur, quod est totus factus, quia de nihilo, quod non est aliquid in actu neque 
in potentia, factus est. Quod autem factum est de aliquo, quod erat in actu vel in potentia, non simplici-
ter factum est, sed secundum quid, posito quod ens in actu sive in potentia esset aeternum; neque per 
consequens Deus esset totus efficiens, sed secundum quid; neque esset absolute prima causa, neque 
finis. Quod est impossibile". Liber de Efficienle in ROL VII, 275. 
1 0 9 Owens, op. cil.. pp. 99-100. 
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the eternal and perfect self-sufficiency of His being, totally fulfilled becau-
se of its infinitely active and productive life within the entitative interior of 
the First Cause. In virtue ot the infinity of the Divine Essence, both the 
eternally active source and the term or perfect completion of the ad intra 
activities within It are given in perfect immanence , all within the interior 
of the Divine Essence, without any separation and multiplicity to mar the 
absolute simplicity of Its being. Therein we find a higher sign of the per-
fect and total self-sufficiency of the reality of the Supreme Being, because 
as a result of, and from the standpoint of, an infinitely active and produc-
tive nature that measures up perfectly, as it were , to the exigencies and 
possibilities of the divine essence, the First Being does not have any need 
at all of any productions ad extra. The only absolutely necessary activity 
and production required to satisfy and fulfill perfectly the infinite possibili-
ties of the divine essence, as it were , are perfectly given within the inte-
rior of the First Being in an eternal and infinite production ad intra.uo 
This eternal active production within the very essence of the Divine Re-
ality does not result in the creation of something that heretofore did not 
have any real being and is added as something new. Nothing is made or 
produced that was not in existence before. The re is no question of any-
thing efficiently caused either within or without the divine essence, simply 
because nothing is made to be that had no being before. Nothing is chan-
ged either from what it was before or from the way in which it was befo-
re , as in the case of the natural and artificial creations in nature and by 
man. It is so, because what is given in the perfectly immanent active pro-
duction within the divine reality is nothing less than the eternal and infini-
te active realization, without a temporal beginning and succession. without 
change or increase of any sort, of the essence and life of the First Being 
who is literally uncaused, immutable , infinitely perfect, eternal and there-
fore, without any transition from non-being to being, not even secundum 
quid.]U To this theme of the eternally and infinitely active and productive 
interior of the divine essence, one with the First Being, Llull constantly 
returned in his writings. With it or by means of it he regularly endeavored 
to establish the reasonableness of the highest revealed doctrine of the 
Christian faith, the mystery of the Trinity of the Divine Persons within the 
one reality and substance that is the One True G o d . 1 1 2 An immediate con-
"" On Llull's insistcnce on the dynamic character of God's entitative interior see Walter Artus, "El 
Dinamismo Divino y su Obra Maxima en el Encuentro de Llull y la Filosofia Musulmana". EL 22 
(1978), 155-197. 
1 1 1 "In nulla essentia infinita et aeterna, in qua et ex qua produccns infinitus et aeternus producit 
infinitum et aeternum, est mutatio. successio atque modus". Liber de Consolalione Eremitarum, 6, ROL 
I, 112. 
1 1 2 In confirmation, almost any of the many opusatla written by Llull at Sicily or at Tunis, not 
more than four years before his death, may be consulted. All of the extant opera Messaniensia et Tuni-
ciana were edited by Johannes Stohr in ROL 1-2 (1959-60). 
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sequence, moreover , of this vision of the perfect divine self-sufficiency and 
fulfilment, rooted in the infinitely active and productive immanence of the 
divine na ture , is the understanding of the total contingency of all the 
works and productions ad extra. The eternally and infinitely active and 
productive entitative interior of the First Being renders any of His possible 
acts of efficient causality, whereby He might create things ad extra either 
out of nothing or ex aliquo, totally without any real necessity on His part . 
Consequently, any creation of whatever type or sort, is a totally free act 
on the part of the First Being, obviously because there is nothing, 
either outside or inside of Him, other than His perfect goodness, will and 
generosity, which can impose on Him the slightest real necessity to make 
the things that H e may choose to create. The production of anything ad 
extra, as noted already, neither adds to , nor takes anything from, nor in 
any way modifies at all, the eternally and totally self-fulfilled character of 
the infinite nature of the First Being. Hence if He chose to create, as He 
has done or does a) whenever he gives existence to spiritual beings and b) 
when H e created the material universe originally, H e does so in perfect 
and absolute freedom, simply out of perfectly free generosity and love. 
On several occasions in his many books , as well also in some oral disputa-
tions with Islamic learned men recorded in The Contemporary Biography, 
Llull explained that it was ignorance of the perfectly immanent active and 
productive character of God ' s infinite nature and perfections that preven-
ted his fellow disputants, as it has prevented many other sages and philo-
sophers before and after them, from ascertaining the real truth about the 
creation of the world. Mistakenly as a result they have frequently looked 
upon the world as eternal and necessary in one fashion or another , and as 
uncreated in many cases. It was while discoursing along these lines, that 
Llull expressed his thoughts in meetings with Mohammedan fellow philo-
sopher-theologians on African soil, on the first two of his three visits and 
stays there . Soon after his first arrival in Tunis in Nor th Africa, Llull ad-
dressed a number of learned Islamic leaders with these words: 
A man ought to have that faith which attributes to the eter-
nal God , in whom all the wise men of the world believe, the 
greater goodness, wisdom, vir tue. . . and which also establish-
es the greater concord or agreement between the Highest and 
First Cause and Its effect. From what you have proposed to 
me , I notice that m regard to the above named and other di-
vine dignities, none of you, Saracens, are in possession of any 
knowledge concerning their proper , intrinsic and eternal acts, 
f 
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without which those dignities would have been rdle from all 
eternity. 1 1 - 1 
And doubtlessly more to the point of the non-necessary character of 
the creation of the world, as of any other possible works ad extra, the 
following excerpt from the Biography is very appropria te . In it we have 
the words that Llull spoke to a leading Islamic leader during the second of 
his three visits to Nor th Africa, about which the Biography informs us. 
These were Llull's words: 
Every being perfectly good is so perfect within itself that it 
s tands in need of neither bringing about nor of soliciting any-
thing outside of itself. Now you assert that God is perfectly 
good from all eternity and into all eternity. Consequent ly, H e 
is in no need of either soliciting or of making anything out-
side Himself, because if H e were H e would not then be per-
fectly good simpliciter. But since you deny the most blessed 
Trinity: on the supposition that It is not , G o d was not per-
fectly good from all eternity, until the moment when He pro-
duced in t ime the good thing that is the universe. On the 
o ther hand, you believe in the creation of the world. A n d 
consequently, (that) G o d became more perfect in goodness 
when he created the world than H e was ever before; for 
goodness is greater through a diffusion of itself than through 
remaining idle. This I have as from you. As for myself, I 
hold that the good itself is diffusive from eternity into eter-
nity. Also this is of the essence of the good, that it is diffusi-
ve of i tself. 1 1 4 
One concluding thought remains for us to complete our explanation 
of Ramon LlulFs understanding of creation stricto sensu, as it applies par-
ticularly, although not exclusively, to the creation of the world. To the 
characteristics we noted that either define or distinguish a creation strictly 
1 1 3 "Hlam fidem tenere decet quemlibet sapientem, quae Deo aeterno, quem cuncti credunt mundi 
sapientes, attribuit maiorem bonitatem, sapientiam. virtutem, veritatem, gloriam et perfectionem et cete-
ra huismodi... Illa etiam fides de Deo laudabilior est, quae inter Dcum, qui est summa et prima causa, 
et inter eius effectum maiorem ponit concordantiam seu convenientiam. Sed ego per ea, quae mihi pro-
posita sunt a vobis, adverto iam, quod vos omnes Saraceni, qui estis sub lege Machometi, non intelligi-
tis, in praedictis et aliis huiusmodi divinis dignitatibus actus proprios esse intrinsecos et aeternos, sine 
quibus dignitates ipsae fuissent otiosae, etiam ab aeterno". Anonymous, Vita Coaelanea, VI, in ROL 
VIII, 290. 
1 1 4 "Omne ens perfectc bonum est in se ita perfectum, quod non indiget facere bonum extra se 
atque mendicare. Tu dicis, quod Deus est perfecte bonus ab aeterno et in aetcrnum; ergo non indiget 
mendicare et facere bonum extra se; quia si sic, tunc non esset perfecte bonus simpliciter. Et quia tu 
negas beatissimam trinitatem: posito, quod non sit, Deus non fuit perfecte bonus ab aeterno, usque 
quod produxit bonum mundi in tempore. Et ideo Deus fuit magis perfectus in bonitate, quando creavit 
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taken, it should be added now that the only possible agent or author of 
such a creation can only be God or the First Being. 1 1 5 It cannot be other-
wise because, as we have seen, a strict creation can only be the work of 
an infinite being endowed with an equally infinite efficient causal power. 
The classical theist and monotheist typified by Ramon Llull can here ap-
peal to the many demostrative reasons which show that such an infinite 
causal power is limited to one instance, namely the Uncaused First Being. 
He alone is, and He alone will ever be, infinite. Accordingly, it must be 
concluded that only the Divine First Being has, and will ever have, the 
requisite infinite, active and efficient power to create stricto sensu, ex nihi-
lo. He alone can be a creator in the full and strict sense of the word, and 
this whether it is a question of the first appearance of any extramental 
reality when the world first began to be, or whether it is a question of the 
production of other beings at any time, but which can only begin to be 
through a strict creation ex nihilo. The latter is the case that holds for the 
creation of the rational souls of men and the spiritual substances we name 
"angels". This thought that God alone has the requisite power to create in 
the strict sense of the word is clarified by Llull on a number of occasions. 
After reminding us for instance, that no single human soul can produce 
itself or bring itself into existence, he gives as the obvious and simple 
reason for saying so, that "no reality can bring itself into being, since it 
cannot at one and the same time be and not be." 1 1 6 Such would of course, 
be the case if a human soul or anything else could be the efficient cause 
of itself. To the next question of whether another spiritual substance, such 
as an angelic substance, can have the power to create one single rational 
soul he then replies in this fashion: 
According to what we have said of the intellect, it follows 
that an angel cannot produce a soul from its own essence... 
nor can it produce a soul from another substance... nor can it 
produce it out of nothing, for then it would be its creator and 
—there would be several creators God and angels: a thing that 
is both impossible and contrary to God's supreme perfections 
and properties.1 1 7 
mundum in tempore, quam ante; cum bonitas sit magis bona diffundendo se, quam existendo otiosa. 
Hoc autem habeo per te. Per me vero habeo, quod bovitas ab aeterno et in aeternum est diffusiva. Et 
hoc est de ratione boni, quod sui ipsius sit diffusivum". Anonymous, Vita Coaelanea in ROL VIII, 298. 
1 1 5 Holloway, op. cit., p. 343; Owens, op. cit., p. 336. 
116 "f)unum e n s potest producere se ipsum, cum illud in uno et eodem tempore non possit esse et non 
esse". Liber de Anima Rationali, p. 1, 2, MOG VI, 422 = Int. vii, 8. 
1 1 7 "Secundum quod jam diximus de intellectu hominis... sequitur, quod angelus non possit produce-
re animam de sua essentia, ... nec etiam possit producere animam de alia essentia, cum sit probatum, 
quod anima sit a creante... nec de nihilo potest illam producere, quia esset illius creator, et esscnt multi 
creatores, scilicet Deus et angeli, quod est impossibile et contra supremas perfectiones et propietatcs 
Dei". Loc. cit. 
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In the words just quoted, Llull makes it clear that according to him, 
God alone is and can be a creator in the strict sense of the word. Not 
even the noblest and highest of angels possesses, or can receive and exer-
cise, the infinite power needed to enable a totally non-existent thing to 
effect the transition from a prior state of tota! nothingness to the subse-
quent possession of the least measure of extramental reality and being. 
The infinite efficient causal power to create is God's exclusive prerogative, 
property and perfection. So much so, that He cannot communicate it to 
any finite being. He cannot do so, not because of any lack of, or defect 
in, His infmite power which extends to all that is rational, positively real 
and good. But "there are two things which He cannot bring about: these 
are sins and contradictions. It is clear that such an 'impotency' is not con-
trary to His infinite power." 1 1 8 To the question of "whether God can com-
municate to a creature the power to create?" Llull gave this reply with 
which this paper will be brought to a close: 
If God could communicate to a creature the power to create, 
then that communicated power would have to be either a 
proper or a common power of the creature. It cannot be a 
proper one since it would have been appropriated to the crea-
ture by God, (and) because no appropriated characteristic can 
be a proper one (at the same time) ... nor can it be a com-
mon one because God and the creature cannot share equally 
in being a single creative principle... because if they could... 
in this manner the produced creature would be both a creatu-
re and not a creature: which is (obviously) a contradiction 
that cannot be . 1 1 9 
Walter W. ARTUS 
St. John's University 
Jamaica, N.Y. 11432 
1 1 8 "Licet Deus habeat inftnitam potestatem. duo tamen sunt, quae non potest facere, scilicet pecca-
tum et contradictionem; et talis impotentia non est contra suam infinitam potestatem". Dispulalio Eremi-
tuie et Raymundi, bk. 2, q. 39, MOG IV, 261 = Int. iv, 37. 
1 , 9 "In Deo est proprium et commune... unde si Deus creaturae posset communicare potentiam 
creandi, aut illa potentia communicata esset propria creaturae, aut communis; non potest esse propria, 
cum esset appropriata creaturae a Deo, cum nullum appropriatum possit esse proprium; ...; nec potest 
esse communis, cum Deus et creatura non possint aequaliter participare in essendo unum principium 
creativum; quia si possent, essent unum principium creativum... et sic Deus et creatura creativa deiflca-
rent et crcarent unam creaturam compositam ex Deo et creatura creativa... et sic creatura producta 
esset creatura et non creatura; quod est contradictio, quae non potest stare; unde sequitur..." Ibid., 
MOG IV, 260-1 = Int. iv, 36-7. 
